| title | tags | id | mtime | ctime | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
pragmatic explanations cannot lead to platonic conclusions |
|
cec627c3-5d81-44ed-9fb2-26742662d7cb |
20210701200843 |
20210204162417 |
Talk with Guido and Ronnie, also listening to [@Batterman2001] .
I have become more sympathetic to the idea that [[an explanation is whatever scientists call an explanation]]. HOwever, what strikes me as very wrong with this si that such a vague assumption or definition of explanation is used to conclude an extrordinarily strong position, namely the fact that mathematical objects are platonically real.
What I do not like about this is that from a quite reasonable sociological account of science we derive extremely ontological conclusions. I think some additional "bridge-principles" are needed to account for such a leap of faith, and can definitely not be assumed.