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<!DOCTYPE html>
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<body style="text-align:justify;font-family:Arial">
<blockquote>
<h1 align="center">THOMAS AQUINAS<br>
DE MEMORIA ET REMINISCENTIA</h1>
<p align="center">Translated by<br>
John Burchill, O.P.
<p align="center">M.A. Dissertation<br>
Dover, Massachusetts, 1962
<p align="center">Latin added by Joseph Kenny, O.P.
<table cellpadding="15">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>
<h3 align="center">Lection 1</h3>
<td>
<h3 align="center">LESSON ONE</h3>
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<td style="text-align:justify">Sicut philosophus dicit, in septimo de historiis animalium, natura ex inanimatis ad animata procedit paulatim, ita quod genus inanimatorum prius invenitur quam genus plantarum: quod quidem ad alia corpora comparatum videtur esse animatum, ad genus autem animalium, inanimatum. Et similiter a plantis ad animalia quodam continuo ordine progreditur: quia quaedam animalia immobilia, quae scilicet terrae adhaerent, parum videntur a plantis differre. Ita etiam et in progressu ab animalibus ad hominem, quaedam inveniuntur, in quibus aliqua similitudo rationis appareat. Cum enim prudentia sit propria virtus hominis (est enim prudentia recta ratio agibilium, ut dicitur in septimo Ethicorum)-, inveniuntur quaedam animalia quamdam prudentiam participare non ex eo quod habeant rationem, sed ex eo quod instinctu naturae moventur per apprehensionem sensitivae partis ad quaedam opera facienda, ac si operarentur ex ratione. Pertinet autem ad prudentiam, ut prudens dirigatur per eam in his quae imminent sibi agenda ex consideratione non solum praesentium, sed etiam praeteritorum. Unde Tullius, in sua rhetorica, partes prudentiae ponit non solum providentiam per quam futura disponuntur, sed etiam intelligentiam per quam considerantur praesentia, et memoriam per quam apprehenduntur praeterita. Unde etiam in aliis animalibus, in quibus invenitur prudentiae similitudo participata, necesse est esse non solum sensum praesentium, sed etiam memoriam praeteritorum. Et ideo philosophus in principio metaphysicorum dicit quod quibusdam animalibus ex sensu memoria fit, et propter hoc prudentia sunt.
<td style="text-align:justify">298. As the Philosopher says in the seventh book <i>On the Histories of Animals</i> nature proceeds little by little from the inanimate to the animate, so that the genus of inanimate things is found prior to the genus of plants. When the genus of plants is compared to other bodies, it seems to be animate, but compared to the genus of animals, inanimate. (Nature) similarly proceeds from plants to animals in a certain continuous order; for certain immobile animals, which cling to the earth, appear to differ little from plants. Likewise in the progression from animals to man, there are found certain animals in which some likeness of reason appears. Although prudence is a virtue proper to man (for prudence is right reason concerned with things to be done, as is said in the seventh book of the <i>Ethics</i>), yet some animals are found to participate in a kind of prudence. The possession of reason is not the cause of this; it is rather that these animals are moved to perform certain works by a natural instinct (working) through the apprehension of the senses, as if they were operating by reason. Moreover it pertains to prudence to direct one by a consideration not only of the present circumstances, but also of past events, in those courses of action which are at hand. For this reason, Cicero, in his <i>Rhetoric</i>, proposes as the parts of prudence not only foresight, by which the future is planned, but also understanding, by which the present is considered, and memory, by which the past is apprehended. Hence it is necessary that there be also in other animals, which show a participated likeness of prudence, not only a sense for the present, but also a memory of the past. Therefore the Philosopher, in the beginning of the <i>Metaphysics</i>, says that in certain animals memory is formed out of the senses, and on this account they are prudent.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Sed sicut prudentiam imperfectam habent respectu hominis, ita etiam et memoriam. Nam alia animalia memorantur tantum, homines autem et memorantur et reminiscuntur; et ideo gradatim Aristoteles post librum, in quo determinatur de sensu, qui communis est omnibus animalibus, determinat de memoria et reminiscentia; quorum alterum invenitur in solis hominibus, alterum vero in his et in animalibus perfectis.
<td style="text-align:justify">299. But as animals have an imperfect prudence compared to man, so also they have an imperfect memory. For other animals only remember, but men both remember and recollect. Therefore Aristotle, going step by step, treats of memory and recollection after the book in which he considered the senses which are common to all animals. One of these (recollection) is found in man alone, but the other (memory) is found both in men and in perfect animals.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Dividitur autem liber iste in partes duas. Primo enim ponit prooemium, in quo manifestat suum propositum. Secundo accedit ad tractandum ea de quibus intendit, ibi, primum quidem igitur.
<td style="text-align:justify">300. This book is divided into two parts: first he (Aristotle) gives a preface in which he shows what he proposes to do; then he proceeds to treat those things which he has in mind, at the words, "First, therefore, etc."
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<td style="text-align:justify">Circa primum dicit de duobus esse dicendum. Primo quidem de memoria et memorari, quod est actus eius, circa quod tria se promittit dicturum. Primum quid sit memoria et quid memorari, et quae sit causa eius, et ad quam partem animae pertineat passio memorandi. Omnes enim operationes sensitivae partis passiones quaedam sunt, secundum quod sentire pati quoddam est.
<td style="text-align:justify">Concerning the first point he says that two things ought to be discussed. The first to be discussed is memory, and remembering, which is its act. Concerning memory and remembering he promises to discuss three points: first, what is memory and what is remembering, then, what is its cause; and finally, to what part of the soul does the passion of remembering pertain. For all the operations of the senses are certain passions insofar as to sense something is to suffer it.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Secundo promittit se dicturum de reminisci. Et ne videretur idem esse reminisci et memorari, subiungit quoddam signum differentiae ipsorum ex parte hominum, in quibus invenitur utrumque. Non enim iidem homines inveniuntur ita bene memorativi et bene reminiscitivi; sed sicut frequenter accidit, illi sunt melius bene memorantes, qui sunt tardi ad inveniendum et discendum. Illi autem melius reminiscuntur, qui sunt velocis ingenii ad inveniendum ex se et bene discendum ab aliis.
<td style="text-align:justify">301. Then, he says that he will discuss recollection. But lest recollection and remembering appear to be the same thing, he adds a certain sign of their difference taken from man in whom both are found. For the same men are not good at remembering and at recollecting. Rather, as it often happens, those who are better at remembering are slow at discovery and learning; those, however, who are quick at discovering for themselves and at learning from others, are better at recollecting.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Cuius ratio est, quia diversae habitudines hominum ad opera animae proveniunt ex diversa corporis dispositione. Videmus autem in corporalibus, quod illa, quae difficiliter et tarde recipiunt impressionem, bene retinent eam, sicut lapis; quae vero de facili recipiunt non retinent bene, sicut aqua. Et, quia memorari nil aliud est quam bene conservare semel accepta, inde est, quod illi qui sunt tardi ad recipiendum, retinent bene recepta, quod est bene memorari. Quia autem de facili recipiunt, plerumque de facili amittunt. Sed reminisci est quaedam reinventio prius acceptorum non conservatorum; et ideo illi, qui sunt velocis ingenii ad inveniendum et recipiendum disciplinam, etiam sunt bene reminiscitivi.
<td style="text-align:justify">302. The reason for this is that the divers aptitudes which men have for the works of the soul depend on divers dispositions of the body. Thus we see in physical things that those which receive an impression slowly and with difficulty, retain it well; e.g., stone; but those which receive it easily do not retain it well; e.g., water. Now since remembering is nothing other than conserving well what has once been received, therefore, those who are slow at receiving retain well what they have received, and this is to remember well. But those receiving easily lose the greater part easily. Recollection, however, is a certain rediscovery of something previously received but not conserved. Therefore, those who are good at discovering and receiving instruction are also good at recollecting.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Deinde cum dicit primum quidem exequitur propositum. Et primo determinat de memorari. Secundo de reminisci, ibi, de reminisci autem reliquum est dicere. Circa primum tria facit. Primo ostendit quid sit memorari. Secundo cuius partis animae sit, ibi, quoniam autem de phantasia. Tertio propter quam causam fiat, ibi, dubitabit autem utique aliquis.
<td style="text-align:justify">303. Then, when he says, "First, indeed, etc." he carries out his proposal. First he explains remembering; then, recollecting, at the words, "About recollection", what is left to say is, etc." Concerning the former he makes three points: he shows what remembering is; then; to which part of the soul it belongs, at the words, "For of the imagination, etc."; and finally, the cause on account of which it operates, at the words, "However, one might question, etc."
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<td style="text-align:justify">Et, quia operationes et habitus et potentiae specificantur ex obiectis, ideo circa primum duo facit. Primo inquirit quid sit obiectum memoriae. Secundo concludit quid sit memoria, ibi, est quidem igitur memoria. Circa primum duo facit. Primo dicit de quo est intentio. Secundo manifestat propositum, ibi, neque enim futura. Dicit ergo primo, quod ad determinandum de memoria, primo oportet accipere qualia sunt memorabilia, quia obiecta sunt priora actibus et actus potentiis, ut dictum est in secundo de anima. Necessarium autem est hoc determinare, quia multotiens accidit deceptio circa hoc, quia aliqui putant quorumdam esse memoriam quorum non est.
<td style="text-align:justify">Now since powers, habits, and operations are specified by their objects, he makes a twofold. consideration concerning the first subject; namely, memory. First he inquires into the object of memory; then he concludes by defining it, at the words, "Memory, therefore, is, etc." Concerning the object of memory he discusses two things. First he gives his intention; then he shows what he proposed to do, where he says, "Neither the future, etc." He says, therefore, that to attain knowledge about memory it is necessary first to discover what sorts of things are objects of memory. (He follows this order) because objects are prior to acts, and acts to powers as has been said in the second book <i>On the Soul</i>. It is necessary to attain this knowledge because deception frequently occurs on this point, since some people say that memory is about things of which it is not.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Deinde cum dicit neque enim manifestat propositum. Et primo dicit quod memoria non est futurorum. Secundo, quod non est praesentium, ibi, neque praesentis. Tertio quod est praeteritorum, ibi, memoria autem facti est.
<td style="text-align:justify">304. Then when he says, "For neither, etc.", he shows what he proposed to do (namely, to determine the object of memory.) First he says that memory is not of future things, and then that it is not of things present, at the words, "Nor of the present, etc." Finally (he determines that memory) is of things past, at the words, "Memory is of what has been completed, etc."
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<td style="text-align:justify">Dicit ergo quod futura non contingit memorari, sed eorum est opinio ex parte virtutis cognoscitivae, dum scilicet aliquis opinatur aliquid esse futurum et sperat ex parte virtutis appetitivae, dum scilicet spes in aliquid futurum quandoque tendit. Dicit autem quod etiam quaedam scientia esse futurorum, quae potest esse sperativa scientia. Quidam autem nominant eam divinativam, quia per eam aliqui possunt cognoscere quid in futurum continget, de quo est spes. Sed, cum spes sit futurorum, quae ab homine acquiri possunt, huiusmodi autem sunt futura contingentia de quibus non potest esse scientia, videtur quod nulla scientia possit esse sperativa futurorum.
<td style="text-align:justify">He says that remembering is not of future things. Rather we have opinion of future things on the part of the knowing faculties, when, for instance, someone opines that something is going to happen. On the part of the appetitive faculties, then, there is hope, since hope tends to some future event at some time. He says, moreover, that there may even be a certain science of future events which would be a science which foretells. Some people call this divination because they can know by it what might happen in the future, concerning which there is expectation. But since hope is of future things which man can obtain, while the future events of which we are speaking are future contingencies, and of these there can be no science, it seems that there can be no science which foretells the future.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Dicendum autem est quod de futuris contingentibus, secundum se consideratis, non potest esse scientia; sed cum in causis suis considerantur, potest de eis scientia esse, prout aliquae scientiae cognoscunt esse inclinationes quasdam ad tales effectus. Sic enim et scientia naturalis est de generabilibus et corruptibilibus. Et hoc etiam modo astrologi possunt per suam scientiam praenuntiare quosdam futuros eventus sperando: puta ubertatem vel sterilitatem, propter dispositionem corporum caelestium ad tales effectus.
<td style="text-align:justify">305. We ought to add that there can be no science of future contingencies considered in themselves, but when these future contingencies are examined in their causes, there can be a science of them, inasmuch as some sciences know that certain things are confined (to produce) given effects. This is the mode in which natural science considers generable and corruptible things. In a similar manner astrologers by their science can make predictions about expected future events. For example, (they can make predictions) about fertility or sterility, because of the positions of the heavenly bodies bearing on such effects.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Deinde cum dicit neque praesentis ostendit quod memoria non est praesentis; sed hoc dicit pertinere ad sensum, per quem neque futurum, neque factum, id est praeteritum, cognoscimus, sed tantummodo praesens.
<td style="text-align:justify">306. Then when he says, "Nor of the present, etc.", he shows that memory is not of the present. But he says that the present pertains to the senses, by which we know neither the future, nor what is completed; i.e. the past, but only the present.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Deinde cum dicit memoria autem ostendit quod memoria est praeteritorum. Et hoc probat ex communi usu loquendi. Cum enim aliquid praesentialiter adest, puta cum aliquis praesentialiter videt album, nullus diceret se memorari album: sicut nullus dicit se memorari illud, quod per intellectum actu consideratur, cum actu considerat et intelligit: sed cum communiter homines vident album, nominant sentire; et considerare aliquid actu, nominant solummodo scire. Cum aliquis autem habet scientiam habitualem et potentiam sensitivam sine actibus vel operationibus eorum, tunc dicitur memorari praeteritorum actuum, puta cum considerat intellectu triangulum habere tres angulos duobus rectis aequales, et forte sensibiliter descriptionem figurae videt: et ex quadam parte operationis intellectualis memoratur aliquis, quia didicit ab alio, vel quia speculatus est per seipsum; ex parte vero sensibilis apprehensionis memoratur, quia audivit vel vidit, vel aliquo alio sensu percepit. Semper enim cum anima memoratur, pronunciat se vel prius audivisse aliquid, vel sensisse, vel intellexisse.
<td style="text-align:justify">307. Then when he says, "Memory, however, etc.", he explains that memory is of things past. The proof for this he takes from the common use of language. When some object is present; e.g., when someone is presently seeing a white object, no one would say that he remembers the white object a Likewise no one says that he remembers what he is actually considering intellectually, when he is actually considering and understanding it. But commonly when men see a white object, they say that they sense it, and actually considering something is called only knowing. But when someone has habitual knowledge and a sense faculty without its operations or acts, he is then said to remember past acts; when, for instance, he grasps intellectually that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles and perhaps sensibly sees the outline of the figure. On the part of the intellectual operation, he remembers because he has learned from another or because he has thought it out for himself; on the part of the sensible apprehension he remembers because he has heard, or seen, or perceived by some other sense. For in every instance in which the soul remembers, it asserts that it has first heard, or sensed, or understood something.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Ex quo patet quod non est intentio philosophi dicere quod memoria non possit esse ipsarum rerum quae in praesenti sunt, sed solum eorum quae in praeterito fuerunt. Potest enim aliquis memorari non solum hominum qui mortui sunt, sed etiam qui nunc vivunt, sicut et suiipsius aliquis dicitur reminisci, secundum illud Virgilii: nec talia passus Ulyxes, oblitusve sui est Ithacus discrimine tanto. Per quod intelligi voluit quod meminit sui. Sed intentio philosophi est dicere quod memoria est praeteritorum quantum ad nostram apprehensionem, idest quod prius sensimus vel intelleximus aliqua indifferenter, sive illae res secundum se consideratae sunt in praesenti sive non.
<td style="text-align:justify">308. From the preceding exposition it is evident that the Philosopher does not intend to say that memory cannot be of things which are themselves in the present, as if it were only of those things which were in the past. For men can remember not only those persons who have died, but also living persons; and one can even be said to recollect himself, as Virgil wrote, "Ulysses brooked, nor was the Ithacan in that sore strait forgetful of himself." By this he wishes it to be understood that he remembered himself. So, the intention of the Philosopher is to affirm that memory is of the past in reference to our apprehension; i.e., previously we either sensed or understood some objects, and it makes no difference whether these things considered in themselves are in the present or not.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Deinde cum dicit est quidem concludit ex praemissis quid sit memoria: quia neque est sensus, quia solum est praesentium; neque est opinio quae potest etiam esse futurorum: sed oportet quod ad aliquid horum pertineat vel per modum habitus, puta si sit aliqua vis permanens, vel per modum passionis, puta si sit aliqua impressio transiens. Sic autem memoria pertinet ad sensum vel opinio, cum intervenit aliquod tempus medium inter priorem apprehensionem sensus vel intellectualis opinionis et memoriam subsequentem, ut sic memoria possit esse praeteritae apprehensionis: quia eius quod nunc apprehenditur, in ipso nunc non est memoria, ut dictum est, sed sensus quidem est praesentis, spes vero futuri, memoria vero praeteriti. Et ideo oportet quod omnis memoria sit cum aliquo tempore intermedio inter ipsam et priorem apprehensionem.
<td style="text-align:justify">309. Then, when he says, "Memory is, therefore, etc.", he concludes from the foregoing what memory is. Memory is neither sense, because sense is of the present alone, nor opinion, which can pertain to the future. However, memory must pertain to something of these, either through the mode of a habit; e.g., if it is some permanent power, or through the mode of a passion; e.g., if it is a transient impression. Now this is the way memory pertains to sense, or opinion: when some period of time intervenes between the prior apprehension of the senses or of the intellectual opinion and the subsequent memory of them, then, it is possible to have memory of the past apprehension. For as we have said, a thing which is apprehended now cannot be remembered in the 'now'. It is sense which is of the present, hope, of course, of the future, and memory of the past. Thus it is necessary that, for everything remembered, there be some time intervening between the memory and the prior apprehension.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Et ex hoc concludit quod sola animalia, quae possunt sentire tempus, memorantur: et illa parte animae memorantur, qua et tempus sentiunt: et de hoc in sequentibus inquiret.
<td style="text-align:justify">310. From the foregoing analysis he concludes that only animals which sense time can remember; and they remember by the part of the soul by which they sense time. Concerning this he inquires in the following section.
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<td style="text-align:justify">
<h3 align="center">Lectio 2</h3>
<td style="text-align:justify">
<h3 align="center">LESSON TWO</h3>
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<td style="text-align:justify">Postquam philosophus ostendit quid est memoria, hic ostendit ad quam partem animae pertineat. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo praemittit quoddam, quod est necessarium ad propositi manifestationem. Secundo manifestat propositum, ibi, magnitudinem autem et motum.
<td style="text-align:justify">311. After the Philosopher has shown what memory is, he now explains to what part of the soul it pertains. Concerning this he does two things. First he prefaces a certain point which is necessary for what he proposes to do, at the words, "Magnitude and movement, however, etc."
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<td style="text-align:justify">Circa primum, primo praemittit quod intendit. Secundario manifestat quod dixerat per exemplum, ibi, accidit enim eadem passio. Tertio ostendit quid circa hoc sit alibi manifestandum, ibi, propter quam igitur causam. Proponit ergo primo, quod in libro de anima dictum est de phantasia quid sit, quia scilicet est motus factus a sensu secundum actum. In eodem etiam libro dictum est quod non contingit hominem sine phantasmate intelligere.
<td style="text-align:justify">Concerning the former, he makes the intended introduction; then he exemplifies it, where he says, "For the same passion happens, etc."; finally he shows what aspect of this is to be explained elsewhere, at the words, "Therefore, for this reason, etc." Therefore, he first notes that in the book <i>On the Soul</i> he has explained what the imagination is, namely, a movement made by the sense in act. In the same book he has also shown that men do not understand without a phantasm.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Deinde cum dicit accidit enim manifestat hoc quod ultimo dixerat. Posset enim alicui videri inconveniens, si non possit homo sine phantasmate intelligere, cum phantasma sit similitudo rei corporalis, intelligere autem sit universalium, quae a particularibus abstrahuntur; et ideo ad huius manifestationem inducit quoddam exemplum, dicens quod ita accidit circa intellectum, quantum ad hoc quod indiget phantasmate, sicut accidit in descriptionibus figurarum geometriae, in quibus describitur quidam triangulus, qui sit alicuius determinatae quantitatis, cum geometra in sua demonstratione non utatur aliqua determinata quantitate trianguli; similiter et homini volenti intelligere rem aliquam proponitur ante oculos phantasma alicuius determinatae quantitatis, utpote singularis: puta volenti intelligere hominem, occurrit imaginatio alicuius hominis bicubiti, sed intellectus intelligit hominem inquantum est homo, non autem inquantum habet quantitatem hanc.
<td style="text-align:justify">312. Then when he says, "For the same passion happens, etc.", he proves what he just said. It might seem incongruous to someone that a man cannot understand without a phantasm, since the phantasm is the likeness of the physical thing, while understanding is of universals, which are abstracted from particulars. Therefore, to manifest this he gives the following example. It happens that the intellect needs a phantasm, just as it happens in the drawing of a geometrical figure in which a triangle is drawn that it must be of some determinate quantity, although the geometrician in his demonstration does not use a determinate quantity of triangle. Likewise a man wishing to understand some object sets before his eyes (recalls to mind) a phantasm of some determinate quantity, insofar as it is singular; for instance, wishing to understand man, the imagination proposes (an image of) some man three feet in height; but the intellect understands man insofar as he is man, not insofar as he has this particular quantity.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Sed quia intellectus potest intelligere naturam quantitatis, ideo subiungit quod, si ea quae debent intelligi, sunt secundum suam naturam quanta, puta linea, superficies et numerus, non tamen finita, idest determinata determinatione singularitatis, nihilominus tamen ponit ante oculos phantasma quanti determinati: sicut volenti intelligere lineam occurrit phantasma lineae bipedalis; sed intellectus intelligit eam solum secundum naturam quantitatis, non secundum quod est bipedalis.
<td style="text-align:justify">313. However, because the intellect can understand the nature of quantity, he notes that if the objects to be understood are by nature quantified, e.g., line, surface, and number—yet not definite, i.e., limited by a determination of singularity—nevertheless, he must present to himself an image of a determined quantity. There occurs, for instance, to a man desiring to understand 'line', a phantasm of a two-foot line, but the intellect understands 'line' only according to the nature of quantity, and not as it is 'of two feet'.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Deinde cum dicit propter quam ostendit ad quam considerationem reservatur hoc; et dicit quod ad aliam rationem pertinet assignare causam, quare nihil potest homo intelligere sine continuo et tempore; quod quidem accidit, inquantum nihil potest homo intelligere sine phantasmate. Phantasma autem oportet quod sit cum continuo et tempore, eo quod est similitudo rei singularis, quae est hic et nunc: quod non potest intelligi sine phantasmate. Quare homo autem non possit intelligere sine phantasmate, de facili potest assignari ratio quantum ad primam acceptionem specierum intelligibilium, quae a phantasmatibus abstrahuntur secundum doctrinam Aristotelis in tertio de anima. Sed experimento patet quod etiam ille qui iam acquisivit scientiam intelligibilem per species intellectas, non potest actu considerare illud cuius scientiam habet nisi occurrat ei aliquod phantasma. Et inde est quod laeso organo imaginationis impeditur homo non solum ab intelligendo aliqua de novo, sed etiam considerando ea, quae prius intellexit, ut patet in phreneticis.
<td style="text-align:justify">314. Then when he says, "For this reason, etc.", he makes clear why this point is reserved, and he says that there is another reason which shows why man can understand nothing without the continuum and time, insofar as man can understand nothing without a phantasm. For a phantasm must be connected with the extended and time, from the very fact that it is a likeness of a singular thing which is 'here and now', and this cannot be understood without a phantasm. The reason why man cannot understand without a phantasm can be easily given in the case of the first reception of the intelligible species, which are abstracted from phantasms, according to the doctrine of Aristotle in the third book <i>On the Soul</i>. But it is also evident from experience that he who has already acquired intelligible knowledge through species grasped in understanding cannot actually consider what he knows unless he has some phantasm, For this reason also, an injury to the organ of imagination impedes man not only from understanding something new, but also from considering what he previously understood, as is evident in the insane.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Posset autem adhuc aliquis dicere quod species intelligibiles non manent in intellectu possibili humano, nisi quamdiu actu intelligit; postquam autem desiit actu intelligere pereunt et cessant species intelligibiles esse in intellectu per modum quo cessat lumen esse in aere apud absentiam corporis illuminantis: et ideo est necesse, si intellectus velit de novo intelligere, quod iterum se convertat ad phantasmata, ut acquirat species intelligibiles.
<td style="text-align:justify">315. However someone could object here that the intelligible species do not remain in the human possible intellect, except as long as a person is actually understanding. Then, after a person is no longer actually understanding, the intelligible species pass away and cease to be in the intellect, in the manner in which light ceases to be in the air when an illuminating body is absent. Thus it is necessary, if the intellect would understand anew, to turn again to phantasms to acquire intelligible species.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Sed hoc est expresse contra verba Aristotelis in tertio de anima, ubi dicit quod, cum intellectus possibilis fiat singula intelligibilia, quod est per species eorum, tunc etiam est in potentia ad intelligendum in actu. Repugnat etiam rationi, cum species intelligibiles recipiantur in actu in intellectu possibili immobiliter secundum modum ipsius, quod autem intellectus possibilis habeat species intelligibiles etiam cum actu non intelligit,
<td style="text-align:justify">316. This (objection) is expressly contrary to the words of Aristotle found in the third book <i>On the Soul</i>. He says there, that since the possible intellect becomes the divers intelligible objects through their species, it is then in potency to actually understand them. (The above statement) is also unreasonable since the intelligible species are actually received in the possible intellect immovably according to its own mode; and so the possible intellect has intelligible species even when not actually understanding.
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<td style="text-align:justify">non est sicut in potentiis sensitivis, in quibus propter compositionem organi corporalis aliud est recipere impressionem, quod facit sentire in actu, et aliud retinere, quando etiam res actu non sentiuntur, ut obiicit Avicenna; sed contingit propter diversum gradum essendi formarum intelligibilium, vel secundum potentiam puram sicut invenire vel addiscere, vel secundum actum purum sicut quando actu intelligit, vel medio modo inter potentiam et actum, quod est esse in habitu.
<td style="text-align:justify">This is not the same as in the sensitive faculties in which, as a result of the composition of the physical organ, it is one thing to receive an impression, which is to sense actually; and another to retain, when the things are not actually being sensed, as Avicenna objects. (The fact that the possible intellect has intelligible species even when not actually understanding) is an effect of the divers grade of being of the intelligible forms, which may be either in pure potency, as in discovery or learning; or in pure act, as when one is actually understanding; or, finally, midway between potency and act, which is to be in the state of a habit.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Non ergo propter hoc solum indiget intellectus possibilis humanus phantasmate ut acquirat intelligibiles species, sed etiam ut eas quodam modo in phantasmatibus inspiciat. Et hoc est quod dicitur in tertio de anima. Species igitur in phantasmatibus intellectivum intelligit.
<td style="text-align:justify">The human possible intellect, therefore, needs a phantasm not only that it might acquire intelligible species, but also that it might inspect them in a certain way in the phantasms. This is what is said in the third book <i>On the Soul</i>. Therefore, the intellect understands species in phantasms.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Huius autem ratio est, quia operatio proportionatur virtuti et essentiae: intellectivum autem hominis est in sensitivo, sicut dicitur in secundo de anima. Et ideo propria operatio eius est intelligere intelligibilia in phantasmatibus, sicut intellectus substantiae separatae operatio est intelligere res secundum se intellectas; et ideo huius est causa reddenda a metaphysico, ad quem pertinet considerare diversos gradus intellectuum.
<td style="text-align:justify">317. The reason for this (mode of understanding) is that operation is proportioned to faculty and essence. Man's intellect, however, is in the sensitive part, as is said in the second book <i>On the Soul</i>. Thus its proper operation is to understand intelligible objects in phantasms, just as the (proper) operation of the intellect of a separated substance is to understand objects intelligible in themselves. The cause of the different modes of understanding is given by the metaphysician, who considers the divers grades of intellect.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Deinde cum dicit magnitudinem autem ostendit ad quam partem animae pertineat memoria. Et primo per rationem. Secundo per signa, ibi, unde et alteris. Tertio concludit propositum, ibi, cuius quidem igitur. Dicit ergo primo, quod necesse est quod eadem parte animae cognoscatur magnitudo et motus, qua etiam cognoscitur tempus. Haec enim tria se sequuntur tam in divisione, quam in eo quod est esse infinitum et finitum, ut probatur in sexto physicorum.
<td style="text-align:justify">318. Then when he says, "Magnitude and motion, however, etc.", he shows to which part of the soul memory belongs: first, by a reason, then, by signs, where he says, "Hence in others, etc."; finally he concludes what he proposed to do, where he says, "Of which part, therefore, etc." He states first, that it is necessary that magnitude and motion be known by the same part of the soul by which time is known. For these three are connected both in their division and in that which constitutes the infinite and finite, as is proved in the sixth book of the <i>Physics</i>.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Magnitudo autem cognoscitur sensu: est enim unum de sensibilibus communibus. Similiter autem et motus, praecipue localis, cognoscitur, in quantum cognoscitur distantia magnitudinis. Tempus autem cognoscitur, inquantum cognoscitur prius et posterius in motu: unde et etiam sensu percipi possunt. Dupliciter autem aliquid sensu percipitur. Uno quidem modo per ipsam immutationem sensus a sensibili et sic cognoscuntur tam sensibilia propria quam etiam communia, a sensibus propriis et a sensu communi. Alio modo cognoscitur aliquid quodam secundario motu, qui relinquitur ex prima immutatione sensus a sensibili. Qui quidem motus remanet etiam quandoque post absentiam sensibilium, et pertinet ad phantasiam, ut habitum est in libro de anima. Phantasia autem, secundum quod apparet per huius immutationem secundariam, est passio sensus communis: sequitur enim totam immutationem sensus, quae incipit a sensibilibus propriis, et terminatur ad sensum communem. Unde manifestum est quod praedicta tria, scilicet magnitudo, motus et tempus, secundum quod sunt in phantasmate, comprehenduntur et cognoscuntur per sensum communem.
<td style="text-align:justify">319. Magnitude, however, is known by the senses, for it is one of the common sensibles. In a like manner motion, especially local motion, is known insofar as the distance of a magnitude is known. But time is known insofar as the prior and posterior in motion are known. For this reason these three can be perceived by the senses. Now a thing is perceived by the senses in two ways. In one way (a thing is perceived) through a change worked in the senses by a sensible object; and thus the proper as well as the common sensibles are known by the proper senses and the common sense. In another way, something is known by a secondary movement which remains after the first change worked in the senses by the sensible object. This movement remains at times even after the sensible objects are gone and pertains to the phantasm, as has been considered in the book <i>On</i> <i>the Soul</i>. But the fantasy insofar as it appears through this secondary movement is a passion of the common sense, for it follows the whole change wrought in the senses which begins from the proper sensibles and is terminated at the common sense. Consequently, it is clear, that these three, namely, magnitude, motion and time, insofar as they are in a phantasm, are comprehended and known by the common sense.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Memoria autem non solum est sensibilium, utputa cum aliquis memoratur se sensisse, sed etiam intelligibilium, ut cum aliquis memoratur se intellexisse. Non autem est sine phantasmate. Sensibilia enim postquam praetereunt, a sensu non percipiuntur, nisi sicut in phantasmate: intelligere etiam non est sine phantasmate, ut supra habitum est. Unde concludit quod memoria sit intellectivae partis animae, sed per accidens; per se autem primi sensitivi, scilicet sensus communis. Dictum est enim supra, quod intelligens proponit in phantasmate quantum determinatum, licet intellectus secundum se consideret rem absentem;
<td style="text-align:justify">320. Moreover, memory is not only of sensible objects for instance, when someone remembers that he has sensed; but it also of intelligible objects, for instance, when someone remembers that he understood. This is not, however, without a phantasm. For sensible objects, after they have passed away, are not perceived by the senses except in a phantasm; understanding also is not without a phantasm, as was noted above. For this reason he concludes that memory belongs to the intellectual part of the soul, but only accidentally; it belongs essentially to the first sensitive element, the common sense. Now it has been said above, that a man understanding represents to himself a determined quantity in the phantasm, even though the intellect in itself considers an absent thing.
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<td style="text-align:justify">ad memoriam autem pertinet apprehensio temporis secundum determinationem quamdam, secundum scilicet distantiam in praesenti nunc. Unde per se memoria pertinet ad apparitionem phantasmatum, per accidens autem ad iudicium intellectus.
<td style="text-align:justify">But the apprehension of time pertains to memory according to a certain determination, namely, a distance in the past from the present instant. Hence, memory pertains essentially to the appearance of phantasms; accidentally to the judgment of the intellect.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Posset aut alicui videri quod ex his quae hic dicuntur, quod phantasia et memoria non sunt potentiae distinctae a sensu communi, sed sint quaedam passiones ipsius. Sed Avicenna rationabiliter ostendit esse diversas potentias. Cum enim potentiae sensitivae sint actus corporalium organorum, necesse est ad diversas potentias pertinere receptionem formarum sensibilium quae pertinet ad sensum, et conservationem earum, quae pertinet ad phantasiam sive imaginationem; sicut in corporalibus videmus quod ad aliud principium pertinet receptio et conservatio: humida enim sunt bene receptiva, sicca autem et dura bene conservativa. Similiter etiam ad aliud principium pertinet recipere formam, et conservare receptam per sensum et intentionem aliquam per sensum non apprehensam, quamvis aestimativa percipit etiam in aliis animalibus, vis autem memorativa retinet, cuius est memorari rem non absolute, sed prout est in praeterito apprehensa a sensu vel intellectu.
<td style="text-align:justify">321. It may seem to someone from what has been said here that the imagination and memory are not faculties distinct from the common sense, but are certain passions of it. However, Avicenna reasonably shows that the faculties are divers. Since sensitive faculties are acts of physical organs, it is necessary that the reception of sensible forms, which pertains to the senses, and their conservation, which belongs to the imagination or fantasy, pertain to divers faculties. As we see in physical things, reception pertains to one principle and conservation to another, for humid things are quite receptive, but dry and hard things are more conservative. Likewise it pertains to one principle to receive a form, to another to conserve the form received by the senses, and to still another to perceive some signification not apprehended by the senses. Although the estimative faculty perceives (the signification) even in other animals, the memorative faculty retains (it). It functions by remembering a thing, not absolutely, but as it was apprehended in the past by the senses or the intellect.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Contingit tamen quod diversarum potentiarum est una quasi radix et origo aliarum potentiarum, quarum actus actum ipsius primae potentiae praesupponunt, sicut nutritiva est quasi radix augmentativae et generativae potentiae, quarum utraque utitur nutrimento. Similiter autem sensus communis est radix phantasiae et memoriae, quae praesupponunt actum sensus communis.
<td style="text-align:justify">322. Thus it happens among divers faculties that one is as the root and origin of the others, and their very acts presuppose the act of the first faculty. For instance, the nutritive function is as the root of the functions of growth and reproduction; each of which uses nutriment. Likewise the common sense is the root of the fantasy and the memory, which presuppose the act of the common sense.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Deinde cum dicit unde et manifestat quod dixerat per duo signa. Quorum primum sumitur ex parte animalium habentium memoriam; et dicit quod, quia memoria est per se primi sensitivi, inde est quod memoria inest quibusdam aliis animalibus habentibus sensum et carentibus intellectu, et non solum homini et quibuscumque aliis habentibus opinionem, quae potest ad intellectum speculativum pertinere, et prudentiam quae pertinet ad intellectum practicum. Si autem memoria esset aliquid de potentiis intellectivis, non inesset multis aliorum animalium, de quibus manifeste constat quod habent memoriam, et tamen non habent intellectum; et forte non inesset memoria alicui mortalium nisi homini, qui solus homo inter mortales habet intellectum.
<td style="text-align:justify">323. Then when he says, "Hence in others, etc.", he manifests what he said by two signs. The first sign is taken from the case of animals possessing memory. Because memory is essentially of the first sensitive element, he says, it is found in certain other animals having senses and lacking an intellect, and not only in man and in certain others having opinion, which can pertain to the speculative intellect, and prudence, which pertains to the practical intellect. If memory were something intellectual, it would not be in many other animals, in which it is certain that there is a memory, and nevertheless, no intellect.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Dicit autem forte, propter quosdam qui dubitaverunt de quibusdam aliis animalibus ab homine utrum habeant intellectum, propter opera quaedam similia operibus rationis, sicut sunt opera simiarum et quorumdam huiusmodi animalium.
<td style="text-align:justify">324. He says, moreover, "perhaps" because some people have wondered whether certain animals besides man possess an intellect, because of certain actions resembling works of reason, such as the actions of apes and certain similar animals.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Secundum signum ponit ibi, quoniam neque et sumitur ex animalibus non habentibus memoriam; et dicit inde esse manifestum quod memoria pertinet per se ad partem sensitivam, quia etiam nunc cum supponimus solum hominem inter mortales habere intellectum, memoria non inest omnibus animalibus, sed solum illa habent memoriam, quae sentiunt tempus. Quaedam enim animalia nihil percipiunt nisi apud praesentiam sensibilium; sicut quaedam animalia immobilia, quae propter hoc habent indeterminatam phantasiam, ut dicitur in secundo et tertio de anima, et propter hoc non possunt cognoscere prius et posterius, et per consequens non habent memoriam.
<td style="text-align:justify">325. The second sign he presents, where he says, "Since, not etc.", and it is taken from animals not possessing a memory. He says that it is clear that memory belongs essentially to the sensitive part, because even now when we suppose that man alone among mortals has an intellect, memory is not in all animals, but those alone have memory which sense time. For certain animals perceive nothing unless they are in the presence of sensible things, as certain immobile animals, which for this reason have an indeterminate imagination, as is said in the second and third book <i>On the Soul</i>.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Semper enim cum anima agit per memoriam, ut prius dictum est, simul sentit quod hoc prius vidit, aut audivit, aut didicit: prius autem et posterius pertinent ad tempus.
<td style="text-align:justify">For this reason they cannot know the prior and posterior, and consequently do not have a memory. For whenever the soul acts by memory, as was said before, it senses at the same time that it previously saw, or heard, or learned this thing. Now, the prior and posterior pertain to time.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Deinde cum dicit cuius quidem concludit propositum. Et dicit manifestum esse ex praemissis ad quam partem animae pertineat memoria, quia ad eam, ad quam pertinet phantasia; et quod illa sunt per se memorabilia, quorum est phantasia, scilicet sensibilia; per accidens autem memorabilia sunt intelligibilia, quae sine phantasia non apprehenduntur ab homine. Et inde est quod ea quae habent subtilem et spiritualem considerationem, minus possumus memorari. Magis autem sunt memorabilia quae sunt grossa et sensibilia. Et oportet, si aliquas intelligibiles rationes volumus memorari facilius, quod eas alligemus quasi quibusdam aliis phantasmatibus, ut docet Tullius in sua rhetorica. Memoria tamen ponitur a quibusdam in parte intellectiva, secundum quod hic per memoriam intelligitur omnis habitualis conservatio eorum, quae pertinent ad partem animae intellectivam.
<td style="text-align:justify">326. Then when he says, "Of which part, therefore, etc.", he concludes what he proposed to do. He says that the part of the soul to which memory pertains is clear from what has been said, because it pertains to that part to which the imagination belongs, and because the things which are essential objects of memory are those of which we have phantasms, namely, sensible objects, while intelligible things, which are not apprehended by man without the imagination, are accidental objects of memory. For this reason we cannot remember well those things which have a subtle and spiritual consideration; those objects that are gross and sensible are better objects of memory. It is necessary, if we wish to facilitate the remembering of intelligible reasons to bind them to certain phantasms, as Cicero teaches in his <i>Rhetoric</i>. Nevertheless memory is placed by some in the intellectual part, insofar as memory is understood to be every habitual conservation of those things which pertain to the intellectual part of the soul.
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<h3 align="center">Lectio 3</h3>
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<h3 align="center">LESSON THREE</h3>
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<td style="text-align:justify">Postquam philosophus ostendit quid sit memoria, et cuius partis animae sit, hic ostendit causam memorandi.
<td style="text-align:justify">327. Now that the Philosopher has shown what memory is, and to which part of the soul it belongs, he shows here the cause of remembering.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo proponit dubitationem. Secundo solvit, ibi, aut est ut contingit.
<td style="text-align:justify">Concerning this he does two things: first he mentions a doubt; then he solves it, where he says, "Either it is, as it happens, etc."
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<td style="text-align:justify">Circa primum tria facit. Primo movet dubitationem. Secundo manifestat quoddam, quod dubitatio supponit, ibi, manifestum enim quoniam oportet. Tertio inducit rationes ad quaestionem, ibi, sed si tale accidens.
<td style="text-align:justify">Concerning the first he does three things: first he mentions the doubt; then he indicates something which the doubt supposes, where he says, "For it is clear, since it is necessary, etc."; finally he brings forth reasons pertaining to the question, at the words, "But if such occurrences, etc."
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<td style="text-align:justify">Dicit ergo primo, quod potest aliquis dubitare, cum in memorando quaedam passio praesentialiter afficiat animam: res vero, cuius memoramur sit absens, propter quid memoramur id, quod non est praesens, scilicet rem, et non memoramur passionem praesentem.
<td style="text-align:justify">Therefore, he says first, that someone may wonder why in remembering we remember the thing which is not present and do not remember the present passion, for in remembering a certain passion affects the soul in the present, but the things remembered are absent.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Deinde cum dicit manifestum enim manifestat quoddam quod supposuerat, scilicet passionem quamdam esse in anima dum memoramur. Et primo manifestat hoc per causam. Secundo per signa, ibi, unde et his quidem.
<td style="text-align:justify">328. Then when he says, "For it is clear, since it is necessary, etc.", he makes clear the thing which he had presupposed; namely, that a certain passion is in the soul while we are remembering. First he manifests this through a cause; then, through signs, where he says, "For which reason, in those, etc."
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<td style="text-align:justify">Dicit ergo primo, manifestum esse quod oportet intelligere aliquam talem passionem a sensu esse factam in anima, et in organo corporis animati, cuius quidem animae memoriam dicimus esse quemdam quasi habitum, quae quidem passio est quasi quaedam pictura, quia scilicet sensibile imprimit suam similitudinem in sensu, et huius similitudo remanet in phantasia etiam sensibili abeunte. Et ideo subiungit quod motus qui fit a sensibili in sensum, imprimit in phantasia quasi quamdam figuram sensibilem, quae manet sensibili abeunte, ad modum, quo illi qui sigillant cum annulis imprimunt figuram quamdam in cera, quae remanet etiam sigillo vel annulo remoto.
<td style="text-align:justify">He says first, therefore, that it is obviously necessary to understand some such passion to have been made by the senses in the soul and in the organ of the animated body. For we say that the memory of the soul is a kind of habit and that the passion is like a picture, because, the sensible thing imprints its likeness on the senses and this likeness remains in the imagination, even when the sensible thing is absent., Therefore, he adds that the movement made on the senses by the sensible thing impresses something like a sensible figure on the imagination, which remains even in the absence of the sensible thing, in the same way as those who seal with rings impress a certain figure in wax, which remains even when the seal or ring has been removed.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Dicit autem, in anima et in parte corporis: quia cum huiusmodi passio pertineat ad partem sensitivam, quae est actus organici corporis, huiusmodi passio non pertinet ad solam animam, sed ad coniunctum. Memoriam autem nominat habitum partis huius, quia memoria est in parte sensitiva: et in ea quae in memoria conservamus, quandoque non actu apprehendimus, sed quasi habitualiter tenemus.
<td style="text-align:justify">329. He says, "In the soul and in part of the body", because the passion, which is an act of the organic body, pertains to the sensitive part; it does not pertain to the soul alone but to the composite. Moreover he calls memory a habit of this part because memory is in the sensitive part, and we retain, as it were, habitually those things which we conserve in the memory, when we are not actually apprehending.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Deinde cum dicit unde et manifestat propositum per signa, scilicet quod in memorando sit praedicta passio praesens. Et dicit quod, propter haec talis passio necessaria est ad memoriam, contingit quod quibusdam non fit memoria, quia sunt in multo motu, sive hoc sit propter passionem corporis sicut infirmis vel ebriis, vel animae sicut in his qui sunt commoti ad iram vel concupiscentiam; aut etiam hoc accidit propter aetatem deputatam augmento sive decremento, et sic propter huiusmodi causas corpus hominis est in quodam fluxu, et ideo non potest retinere impressionem quae fit ex motu rei sensibilis, sicut contingeret si aliquis motus vel etiam sigillum imprimeretur in aquam fluentem. Statim enim propter fluxum deperiret figura.
<td style="text-align:justify">330. Then when he says, "For this reason, in those, etc.", he manifests what he proposed, through signs, namely, that in remembering, the above mentioned passion is present. He says that since such an experience is necessary to memory, it happens that certain people do not have a memory because they are involved in great movement, whether this is because of an afflicted state of the body, as in the infirm or the inebriated, or, because of the soul, as in those aroused to anger or concupiscence. This also happens if one is at an age marked by growth or decline. For through such causes the body of man is in a certain flux; and, therefore, cannot retain an impression which is made from the movement of a sensible thing, as would happen if some movement or even a seal is imprinted on flowing water. The figure would disappear immediately because of the flow.
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<td style="text-align:justify">In quibusdam vero aliis non recipitur praedicta impressio. Quandoque quidem propter frigiditatem congelantem humores, sicut accidit in his qui sunt in magno timore constituti: quod propter frigiditatem quamdam non potest imprimi aliquid in anima ipsorum. Et ponit exemplum de antiquis aedificiis, cum paries est novus antequam cementum inspissetur, potest de facili immutari, non autem postquam inspissatur. Quandoque autem accidit non propter infrigidationem, sed propter duritiem naturalem eius quod debet recipere passionem. Corpora enim terrestria duritiem habent etiam si sint calida, corpora vero aquea indurantur per hoc quod superfrigidantur. Et propter praedictas causas, illi qui sunt multum novi sicut pueri, et etiam senes, sunt immemores, quia corpora puerorum sunt in fluxu propter augmentum, senum vero propter decrementum; ideo in neutris bene retinetur impressio.
<td style="text-align:justify">331. Moreover in some others the previously mentioned impression is not received. At times it happens because of frigidity congealing the humors, as in those who are in great fear; for on account of frigidity nothing can be impressed on their souls. He gives (herein) the example of old buildings. The wall, when it is new and before the cement has hardened, can easily be changed, but not after it has hardened. It does not happen, at times, because of frigidity, but because of the natural hardness of what should receive the passion. For earthy bodies are hard even if they are hot, but watery bodies are hardened through being frozen. For the reasons given above, those who are very young, as boys, and also the old, are deficient in memory, because the bodies of boys are in constant movement because of growth; the old, on the other hand, because of decline. Therefore, an impression is well retained in neither (group).
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<td style="text-align:justify">Contingit tamen quod ea quae quis a pueritia accipit, firmiter in memoria tenet propter vehementiam motus; ex quo contingit ut ea quae admiramur, magis memoriae imprimantur. Admiramur autem nova praecipue et insolita: pueris de novo mundum ingredientibus maior advenit admiratio de aliquibus quasi insolitis: et ex hac etiam causa firmiter memorantur; secundum autem complexionem fluentis corporis, naturaliter competit illis ut sint labilis memoriae. Subiungit autem quod similiter propter praedicta, neutri videntur esse bene memores: neque illi qui sunt multum velocis apprehensionis, neque illi qui sunt multum tardae.
<td style="text-align:justify">332. Yet it happens that things which one receives in boyhood are firmly held in the memory because of the vehemence of the movement, just as it happens that things about which we wonder are imprinted more in the memory. We wonder especially, however, at the new and unusual: hence a greater wondering about things, as if they were unusual, affects the young who are going about the world for the first time; for this reason they remember firmly. However, because of the disposition of their changing body, it is their lot to be weak in memory; He adds, moreover, that similarly for the reasons given previously, neither those who are especially swift at apprehending, nor those who are too slow are good at remembering.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Illi enim qui sunt multum veloces, sunt magis humidi quam oportet. Humidi enim est facile recipere impressiones. Illi autem, qui sunt magis tardi, sunt etiam magis duri; et ideo velocius non remanet impressio phantasmatis in anima. Duros autem non tangit, idest non recipiunt phantasmatis impressionem.
<td style="text-align:justify">Those who are especially quick are more humid than they ought to be, for it is easy for the humid to receive impressions. But those who are slower are also harder, and, therefore, the impression of the phantasm does not remain as readily in the soul. "However, it does not touch the hard"; i.e., they do not receive the impression of the phantasm.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Potest etiam aliter exponi quod dictum est, ut primo quidem intelligat assignasse causam defectus memoriae propter motum supervenientem, quam postea manifestavit per exemplum iuvenum et senum. Secundo autem assignavit causam ex naturali complexione, vel quia in aliquibus abundat humor aqueus qui est frigidus et humidus, et ideo disperguntur de facili in eis impressiones phantasmatum, sicut faciliter dilabuntur antiqua aedificia; vel quia in aliquibus abundat humor terrestris, qui propter duritiem non recipiunt impressionem. Et hoc postea manifestavit per exemplum velocium et tardorum.
<td style="text-align:justify">333. What has been said can be explained in another way, so that one would read, first, that he has designated the supervening movement as the cause for the defect of memory, which, afterwards, he manifested by the example of the young and old. Then, secondly, he designated a cause from a natural disposition, for the watery humor, which is cold and moist, abounds in some, and, therefore, the impressions of the phantasms are easily dispelled in them, as old buildings easily collapse; while in others the earthy humor abounds, and so they do not receive the impression because of its hardness. Afterwards he manifests this through the example of those who are swift and slow (at apprehending).
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<td style="text-align:justify">Est autem considerandum, quod ideo praemisit impressionem phantasmatis fieri in anima et in parte corporis, ut postmodum ostenderet homines diversimode se habere ad huiusmodi impressionem propter diversam corporis dispositionem.
<td style="text-align:justify">334. It must also be considered that he previously said that the impression of the phantasm is made in the soul and in part of the body, so that afterwards he might show that men are related differently towards an impression of this kind because of divers dispositions of the body.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Deinde cum dicit sed si tale argumentatur ad quaestionem prius propositam. Et primo iam manifestato quod suppositum erat, resumit quaestionem; et dicit quod, si hoc accidit circa memoriam, scilicet quod sit in ea passio quaedam praesens ut pictura, quaerendum est: utrum aliquis memoratur hanc passionem, quae praesentialiter est in memorante, aut rem sensibilem a qua facta est ita impressio.
<td style="text-align:justify">.335. Then, when he says, "But if such occurrences, etc.", he argues about the previously raised question. First, having manifested what he supposed, he resumes the question. He says that if this happens with regard to memory, namely, that there is a certain present passion in it, as in a picture, it must be asked whether a person remembers this passion which is present in himself when remembering, or the sensible thing from which that impression was made.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Secundo ibi, si quidem enim hoc, obiicit ad unam partem, et dicit quod, si quis dicat quod homo memoratur hanc passionem praesentem, sequitur quod nihil absentium memoretur, quod est contra praedeterminata.
<td style="text-align:justify">336. Then, where he says, "If the former, etc.", he raises the objection to the one solution, saying, that if someone should say that man remembers the present passion it would follow that he would remember nothing of the absent (things), which is against what has already been decided.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Tertio ibi, si vero illud, obiicit ad partem aliam tribus rationibus. Quarum primam ponit dicens quod, si aliquis memoretur illam rem a qua facta est passio, videtur esse inconveniens quod homo sentiat id quod est praesens, scilicet passionem, et simul cum hoc memoretur id quod est absens, quod non potest sentire. Dictum est enim quod memoria pertinet ad primum sensitivum: et sic non videtur quod sensus sit de uno, et memoria de alio.
<td style="text-align:justify">337. Finally, at the words, "If the latter, etc.", he raises three objections to the other solution. He gives the first, saying, that if someone remembers that thing from which a passion has been elicited, it would seem incongruous that a man would sense what is present; namely, the passion, and simultaneously remember what is absent, which he is unable to sense. For it has been said that memory pertains to the first sensitive element (common sense); and thus it does not, seem that sense is of one thing and memory of another.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Secundam rationem ponit, ibi, et si est simile. Et dicit quod, si huiusmodi passio, quae est praesens memoranti, est in nobis sicut quaedam figura aut pictura ipsius sensus in repraesentando primam immutationem sensus a sensibili, quare memoria erit alterius, scilicet rei, et non ipsiusmet figurae vel picturae? Cum enim sit figura sensus, manifestum et quod apprehendi potest. Et etiam hoc experimento patet quod ille qui memoratur, speculatur aliquid per intellectum circa hanc passionem vel sentit per partem sensitivam. Videtur autem inconveniens quod praesente eo quod cadit sub apprehensione, illud non apprehendatur sed aliquid aliud.
<td style="text-align:justify">338. He gives the second objection where he says, "And if it is like, etc." He says that if a passion of this kind, which is present to the one remembering, is in us as a certain figure or picture of the senses themselves by way of their representing the first change worked in the senses by the sensible object, why will memory be of another; namely, of the thing and not of the picture or figure itself? For since the sense is the figure, it is plain that it can be apprehended. Moreover, it is also evident from experience that he who remembers speculates intellectually on this passion, and he senses (it too) by the sensitive part. It seems incongruous, however, that when a thing is present which falls under apprehension, it itself should not be apprehended, but something else.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Tertiam rationem ponit, ibi, quomodo igitur. Et quaerit quomodo aliquis possit per sensum interiorem memorari illud quod non est praesens. Cum enim sensus exterior sit conformis sensui interiori, sequeretur quod sensus exterior esset rei non praesentis, ita scilicet quod contingeret videre et audire rem non praesentem, quod videtur inconveniens.
<td style="text-align:justify">339. He offers the third objection at the words, "How then, etc." He asks how someone could remember what is not present by an internal Sense. Since the external senses are conformed to the internal senses, it would follow that the external senses would be dealing with a thing which is not present, so that, for instance, one would see and hear a thing not present, and this seems objectionable.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Deinde cum dicit aut est ut solvit propositam quaestionem. Et primo ostendit per quam causam contingat memorari. Secundo ostendit quae sit causa quod aliquid bene in memoria conservetur, ibi, meditationes autem. Tertio epilogat, ibi, quod quidem igitur. Circa primum duo facit. Primo solvit dubitationem. Secundo manifestat solutionem per signum, ibi, et ob hoc aliquando.
<td style="text-align:justify">340. Then, when he says, "Either it is as it happens, etc.", he solves the question raised. First he shows the cause of remembering; then he shows what causes something to be well preserved in the memory, where he says, "Exercises, however, etc."; finally he gives a summary, at the words, "What indeed, etc." Concerning the first he does two things: first he solves a doubt; then he makes the solution clear by a sign, where he says, "And because of this, sometimes, etc."
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<td style="text-align:justify">Dicit ergo primo, quod potest assignari quomodo contingat et accidat hoc quod dictum est, scilicet quod aliquis sentiat passionem praesentem et memoretur rem absentem. Et inducit exemplum de animali quod pingitur in tabula, quod quidem et est animal pictum et est imago animalis veri. Et, cum idem subiecto sit cui conveniunt haec ambo, differunt tamen haec duo ratione; et ideo alia est consideratio eius inquantum est animal pictum, et alia inquantum est imago animalis veri; ita etiam et phantasma quod est in nobis potest accipi vel prout est aliquod in se, vel prout est phantasma alterius. Et secundum se quidem est quoddam speculatum, circa quod speculatur intellectus vel phantasia quantum pertinet ad partem sensitivam. Secundum vero quod est phantasma alterius, quod prius sensimus vel intelleximus, sic consideratur ut imago in aliud ducens, et principium memorandi.
<td style="text-align:justify">He says, therefore, that it can be explained how what has been said occurs and happens, namely, that someone perceives the present passion and remembers the absent thing. He presents the example of an animal painted on a tablet, which is both a depicted animal and an image of a real animal. Although both aspects belong to the same subject, nevertheless, these aspects differ in formality. Thus one is a consideration of it as a depicted animal, the other as it is the image of a real animal. In a similar manner the phantasm, which is in us, can be taken as it is something in itself, or as it is a phantasm of another thing. In itself it is to be regarded as a kind of object on which the intellect speculates, or the fantasy also, inasmuch as it pertains to the sensitive part, As it is a phantasm of another thing, which we sensed or understood previously, it is considered as an image leading to another and. the principle of remembering.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Et ideo, cum anima memoretur secundum modum phantasmatis, si anima convertatur ad ipsum secundum se, sic videtur animae adesse, vel aliquid intelligibile quod intellectus in phantasmate inspicit, vel simpliciter phantasma quod vis imaginativa apprehendit. Si vero anima convertat se ad phantasma inquantum est phantasma alterius, et consideret ipsum tamquam imaginem eius quod prius sensimus vel intelleximus, ut dictum est circa picturam; et sicut ille qui non videt Coriscum et considerat eius phantasma ut Corisci imaginem, haec iam est alia passio huius considerationis, quia videlicet iam hoc ad memoriam pertinet.
<td style="text-align:justify">341. Therefore, since the soul remembers in the mode of a phantasm, if the soul turns to it in itself, it seems to be present to the soul, either as something intelligible which the intellect looks at in the phantasm, or simply as the phantasm which the imaginative faculty apprehends. If the soul turns to the phantasm insofar as it is the phantasm of another thing, and considers it as an image of what we previously sensed or understood, as was said concerning the picture (e.g., if someone does not see Coriscus but considers a phantasm of him as the image of Coriscus), there is now another passion to this consideration, and now this pertains to memory.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Et sicut accidit de phantasmate alicuius singularis hominis, puta Corisci imaginem, quod quandoque consideratur secundum se quandoque ut imago, ita etiam accidit circa intelligibilia: quandoque enim intellectus inspicit ad phantasma, sicut ad quoddam animal pictum, si inspiciat ad ipsum secundum se, sic solum consideratur ut quoddam intelligibile; si autem intellectus inspiciat ad ipsum inquantum est imago, sic erit principium memorandi, sicut accidit ibi, idest circa particularia.
<td style="text-align:justify">342. Moreover, just as it happens with the phantasm of some singular man, that sometimes it is considered in itself and sometimes as an image; e.g., the linage of Coriscus; so also it happens with intelligible objects. For sometimes the intellect looks at a phantasm as at a certain depicted animal, (and this occurs) if it looks at it in itself, and thus it is considered solely as a certain intelligible thing; if, however, the intellect looks at it as it is an image, it will thus be a principle of remembering, as it happens 'herein'; i.e., concerning particular things.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Sic igitur manifestum est quod quando anima convertit se ad phantasma, prout est quaedam forma reservata in parte sensitiva, sic est actus imaginationis sive phantasiae, vel etiam intellectus considerantis circa hoc universale. Si autem anima convertatur ad ipsum, inquantum est imago eius, quod prius audivimus aut intelleximus, hoc pertinet ad actum memorandi.
<td style="text-align:justify">343. Therefore, it is evident (from this), that when the soul turns itself to the phantasm, as it is a certain form reserved in the sensitive part, there is thus an act of the imagination or the fantasy, or even of the intellect considering this (in the) universal. If, however, the soul turns to it as an image of what we previously heard or understood, it pertains to the act of remembering.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Et quia esse imaginem significat intentionem quamdam circa formam, ideo convenienter Avicenna dicit quod memoria respicit intentionem, imaginatio vero formam per sensum apprehensam.
<td style="text-align:justify">Therefore, because being an image implies a certain signification about a form, Avicenna aptly says that memory regards the intention, imagination, the form apprehended by the senses.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Deinde cum dicit et ob hoc manifestat quod dixerat per quaedam signa. Et dicit quod, quia tunc memoramur quando attendimus ad phantasma, secundum quod est imago eius quod prius sensimus et intelleximus, ideo circa actum memoriae tripliciter se habent homines.
<td style="text-align:justify">344. Then when he says, "And because of this, sometimes, etc." he makes clear what he said, by certain signs. He says that because we remember at the time when we attend to the phantasm, to the extent that it is the image of what we previously sensed and understood, therefore, men are situated. in relation to the act of memory in a threefold manner.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Aliquando enim quamvis in nobis sint motus phantasmatum, qui sunt facti ab eo quod sensimus, qui scilicet relinquuntur ex prima immutatione sensus proprii a sensibili, tamen nescimus si accidat hos motus esse in nobis secundum hoc quod prius sensimus aliquid. Et ideo dubitamus utrum memoremur vel non.
<td style="text-align:justify">345. For sometimes there occurs in us movements of phantasms, which are formed from what we sensed and are left behind from the first change of a proper sense by the sensible thing; but we do not know whether these movements are in us because we previously sensed something. Thus we wonder whether we are remembering or not.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Secundo vero contingit aliquando quod hoc intelligit et reminiscitur, quia prius audivimus aut vidimus aliquid cuius phantasma tunc nobis occurrit, quod est proprie memorari: et hoc contingit quando ille qui speculatur phantasma movetur quidem ab ipso praesenti phantasmate, sed considerat ipsum inquantum est imago alterius, quod prius sensit vel intellexit.
<td style="text-align:justify">346. Then, it sometimes happens that a man understands and recollects something because the phantasm of what (he) has previously heard or seen then occurs to (him), which is properly remembering. This happens when a man, who is imagining a phantasm, is moved indeed by the present phantasm itself; but considers it insofar as it is the image of another which he previously sensed or understood.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Tertio autem modo aliquando accidit contrarium primi modi, ut scilicet credat homo se memorari cum non memoratur, sicut accidit cuidam, qui dicebatur Antipheron, et erat origine Orcitas; et similiter contingit illis qui patiuntur alienationem mentis. Phantasmata enim quae eis de novo occurrunt existimant ac si essent aliquorum prius factorum, ac si memorentur illa, quae nunquam viderunt vel audierunt. Et hoc contingit cum aliquis considerat id quod non est imago alterius prius facti, ac si esset eius imago.
<td style="text-align:justify">347. Finally, the contrary of the first way sometimes happens, so that man believes that he remembers when he has not remembered, as happened to a certain man named Antipheron, who came from Oretanus; and it also happens to those suffering from mental derangement. For they think that phantasms occurring to them for the first time are, as it were, of some previous events, as if they remembered those things which they never saw or heard. This happens when one considers what is not the image of another prior event as if it were its image.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Deinde cum dicit meditationes autem ostendit per quae memoria conservetur. Et dicit quod frequentes meditationes eorum quae sensimus aut intelleximus conservant memoriam ad hoc quod aliquis bene reminiscatur eorum quae vidit aut intellexit. Nihil autem est aliud meditari, quam multotiens considerare aliqua, sicut imaginem priorum apprehensorum et non solum secundum se; qui quidem modus conservandi pertinet ad rationem memoriae. Manifestum autem est quod ex frequenti actu memorandi habitus memorabilium confirmatur, sicut et quilibet habitus per similes actus, et multiplicata causa fortificatur effectus.
<td style="text-align:justify">348. When when he says, "Exercises, however, etc.", he shows by what things memory is preserved. He says that frequent meditations on those things which we sensed or understood preserve their memory so that one recollects well the things which he saw or understood. Meditation is nothing other than considering things many times as an image of things previously apprehended and not only in themselves, which mode of preserving pertains to the formality of memory. It is clear, too, that by the frequent act of remembering the habit of memorable objects is strengthened, as also any habit (is strengthened) through similar acts; and a multiplication of the cause fortifies the effect.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Deinde cum dicit quid quidem epilogat similiter supradicta. Et dicit quod dictum est quid memoria et memorari, quia memoria est habitus, idest habitualis quaedam conservatio phantasmatis, non quidem secundum seipsum (hoc enim pertinet ad virtutem imaginativam), sed inquantum phantasma est imago alicuius prius sensati. Dictum est etiam ad quam partem animae earum, quae in nobis sunt, pertineat, quia scilicet pertinet ad primum sensitivum, inquantum per ipsum cognoscimus tempus.
<td style="text-align:justify">349. Then when he says, "What, therefore, etc.", he summarizes similarly the aforesaid. He says that, it has been noted what memory is and what remembering is: that memory is a habit; i.e., a certain habitual preservation of a phantasm, not, indeed in itself (for this pertains to the imaginative faculty), but insofar as the phantasm is an image of something previously sensed. We have also shown to what part of the soul (of the things which are in us) memory belongs; namely, that it pertains to the first sensitive element (common sense), insofar as we know time through it.
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<h3 align="center">Lectio 4</h3>
<h3 align="center">LESSON FOUR</h3>
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<td style="text-align:justify">Postquam philosophus determinavit de memoria et memorari, nunc determinat de reminisci. Et primo dicit de quo est intentio. Secundo prosequitur propositum, ibi, non enim est memoria.
<td style="text-align:justify">350. After the Philosopher has come to a decision concerning memory and remembering, he now resolves the question of recollecting. First he says what, his intention is; then he continues what be proposed to do, where he says, "For recollection is not, etc."
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<td style="text-align:justify">Dicit ergo primo, quod, postquam dictum est de memorari, reliquum est dicere de reminisci, hoc ordine ut quaecumque vera possint accipi per disputativas rationes, primo supponantur quasi existentia vera: per quod excusat se a prolixa disputatione eorum quae ad reminiscentiam pertinent.
<td style="text-align:justify">Therefore, he says first, that, after speaking about remembering, he must yet speak about recollecting in this order, so that whatever truths can be understood by argumentative reasonings are first supposed as actual truths, and thus he excuses himself from a prolonged argument, about those things which pertain to recollection.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Deinde cum dicit non enim exequitur propositum. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostendit quid sit reminiscentia, per comparationem ad alias apprehensiones. Secundo determinat modum reminiscendi, ibi, contingunt autem reminiscentiae. Tertio ostendit qualis passio sit reminiscentia, ibi, quod autem corporea quaedam passio.
<td style="text-align:justify">351. Then when he says, "For recollection is not, etc.", he continues what he proposed to do. Concerning this he does three things. First he shows that recollection is by a comparison to other apprehensions; then he resolves the mode of recollecting, where he says, "However, they have recollection, etc." Finally he shows what kind of a passion recollection is, where he says, "But that is a certain bodily passion, etc."
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<td style="text-align:justify">Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quid non sit reminiscentia. Secundo quid sit, ibi, sed cum resumat. Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit quod intendit. Secundo manifestat propositum, ibi, cum enim primum addiscat. Dicit ergo primo, quod reminiscentia neque est resumptio memoriae, ita quod nihil aliud sit reminisci quam iterato memorari; neque iterum reminiscentia est prima acceptio alicuius cognoscibilis, puta quae fit per sensum vel per intellectum.
<td style="text-align:justify">He does two things concerning the first. First he shows what recollection is not; then, what it is, at the words, "But as then (something) would reoccur, etc." Concerning the first he does two things. First he proposes what he intends; then he manifests what he proposed to do, at the words, "For at the instant when one first learns, etc." He says, therefore, first, that recollection is neither a reoccurrence of memory, in such a way that recollecting is nothing other than remembering again, nor, again, is recollection the first acquisition of some knowable object; e.g., what is a formed by the senses or the intellect.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Deinde cum dicit cum enim manifestat quod dixerat. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit differentiam duorum quae proposuerat, scilicet resumptionis memoriae et acceptionis. Secundo ostendit quod reminiscentia non sit memoriae resumptio, neque etiam acceptio, ibi, amplius manifestum. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quod acceptio non est memoria, quia ille qui accipit non memoratur. Secundo ostendit, quod nec e converso memorari est acceptio, eo quod ille qui memoratur non de novo accipit, ibi, neque ex principio.
<td style="text-align:justify">352. Then when he says, "For at the instant when one first learns, etc.", he makes clear what he said. He does two things concerning this: first he shows the difference between the two things which he noted, namely, the reoccurrence of memory and the acquisition (of knowledge); then he shows that recollection is neither the reoccurrence of memory nor the acquisition (of knowledge), at the words, "Furthermore" it is clear, etc." Concerning the first he does two things. First he shows that the acquisition (of some knowable object) is not memory" because the person acquiring does not remember; then he shows, on the other hand, that remembering is not the acquisition (of some knowable object), because the person remembering does net acquire something new, where he says, "Nor does he acquire, etc."
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<td style="text-align:justify">Dicit ergo primo, quod, cum aliquis primum addiscat vel patiatur quantum ad apprehensionem sensitivam, nullam memoriam tunc resumit, quia nihil resumitur nisi prius existens: nulla autem memoria praecessit; ergo primum addiscere vel sentire non est memoriam resumere.
<td style="text-align:justify">Therefore, he says first, that when someone first learns or suffers a sensitive apprehension, there occurs no memory at that time, because nothing reoccurs unless it first existed; but no memory preceded. Therefore, to learn or sense for the first time is not to have a memory reoccur.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Deinde cum dicit neque ex ostendit quod memorari non sit prima acceptio. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit quod memorari non consistit in hoc quod est accipere notitiam. Secundo ostendit quod non consistit in hoc quod est primo acceptum esse, ibi, adhuc autem. Dicit ergo primo, quod neque etiam memorans accipit a principio notitiam rei memoratae.
<td style="text-align:justify">353. Then when he says, "Nor does he acquire, etc.", he shows that remembering is not the first acquisition (of some knowable object). Concerning this he does two things. First he shows that remembering does not. consist in acquiring knowledge,; then he shows that it does not consist in acquiring (knowledge) in the first instant, at the words, "Further, at the very individual, etc." Thus, he says first, that the person remembering does not acquire knowledge of the thing remembered from the first instant.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Cum enim memoria sit facti, ut supra habitum est, tunc est memor, quando notitia per modum habitus vel saltem passionis iam est in facto esse. Sed, cum fit prima passio in ipsa, scilicet acceptione notitiae, nondum est in facto esse; ergo nondum fit in homine memoria.
<td style="text-align:justify">Since memory is of what is completed, as was noted above, there is memory only when knowledge through the mode of a habit or at least of a passion is already existing as completed. But, when the first passion is formed in the acquisition of knowledge, it is not yet completed; therefore, memory is not yet present in man.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Deinde cum dicit adhuc autem ostendit quod neque memoria est in primo instanti in quo iam facta est notitia, sive per modum habitus, sive per modum passionis, sicut quando nondum notitia est in habitum versa. Ubi considerandum est quod sicut probatur in sexto physicorum, primo dicitur esse factum aliquid in indivisibili instanti, quod est ultimum temporis mensurantis motum. Dicit ergo quod cum primo facta est notitia in indivisibili, quod est ultimum temporis generationis notitiae, in illo quidem instanti dici potest quod iam inest patienti, id est acquirenti notitiam, passio et scientia, ita ut non faciamus vim in nomine scientiae, quod proprie significat habitum, sed accipiamus hoc nomen communiter pro habitu et pro passione. Et ratio huius quod dicit est, quia semper in ultimo instanti generationis verum est dicere illud esse cuius est generatio, sicut in ultimo instanti generationis ignis, ignis iam est. Existente autem scientia, nihil prohibet memorari ea quae iam scimus, sed hoc est per accidens. Non enim memoramur ea inquantum in praesenti eorum scientiam habemus, sed per se memorari non contingit ante factum tempus, scilicet antequam interveniat tempus medium inter notitiam prius existentem et ipsam memoriam. Memoratur enim nunc aliquis quae prius audivit vel vidit vel qualitercumque passus fuit, non autem nunc memoratur quod nunc passus est. Manifestum est autem quod primo aliquis iam passus dicitur in ipso ultimo instanti passionis; non ergo tunc potest esse memoria.
<td style="text-align:justify">354. Then when he says, "Further, at the very individual, etc.", he shows that there is no memory either through the mode of a habit or through the mode of a passion in the first instant in which knowledge is just achieved, for knowledge is not yet converted into a habits. In this regard we should note what is proved in the sixth book of the <i>Physics</i>, that a thing is said to be completed only in the indivisible instant which is the term of time measuring the motion. He says, therefore, that when knowledge has been once achieved in the indivisible, which is the term of time of the generation of the knowledge, it can be said that, in that instant it is already in the patient; i.e., the passion and science (are already) in the one acquiring the knowledge. We are not speaking strictly here when we apply the name 'science', which properly signifies a habit, but we are taking this name as a common term for habit and passion. The reason for what he says is this: it is always true to say that the thing generated exists in the ultimate instant of its generation; e.g., in the ultimate instant of the generation of fire, fire now is. Thus, when science exists, nothing prevents a remembering of those things which we already know, but this is by accident, For we do not remember those things inasmuch as we have science of them in the present, for essentially memory does not occur before time has elapsed, namely, before an intermediate time intervenes between the previously existing knowledge and the memory itself. A person now remembers what he previously heard, or saw, or suffered in any other way; he, however, does not now remember what he is suffering now. For it is clear that one is said to be suffering now, for the first time, in the last instant of the passion. Therefore, memory cannot be at that time.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Deinde cum dicit amplius manifestum ostendit ulterius quod reminiscentia nec est memoriae resumptio, nec nova acceptio. Et dicit per praemissa manifestum esse quod memorari contingit non nunc reminiscentem, id est non memoratur aliquis huius quod nunc reminiscitur, sed eius quod a principio sensit vel qualitercumque passus est. Et sic reminiscentia non est resumptio memoriae, sed refertur ad aliquid quod prius aliquis apprehendit.
<td style="text-align:justify">355. Then when he says, "Furthermore, it is clear, etc.", he shows further that recollection is neither the reoccurrence of a memory nor the acquisition of something new. He says that it has been made clear through the foregoing, that remembering does not happen to a person now recollecting; i.e., one does not remember what he is now recollecting, but what he sensed or in any other way suffered in the first instant. Thus, recollection is not the occurrence of memory; but it is referred to something which someone previously apprehended.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Deinde cum dicit sed cum manifestat quid sit reminiscentia. Et primo dicit, quod reminiscentia est resumptio primae acceptionis. Secundo ostendit quod non quaelibet talis resumptio est reminiscentia, ibi, neque itaque.
<td style="text-align:justify">356. Then he says, "Further, it is clear, etc.", he shows what recollection is. He says first, that recollection is the recovery of the first acquisition; then he shows that not every such recovery is recollection, at the words, "And so, not, etc."
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<td style="text-align:justify">Dicit ergo primo, quod reminiscentia non est resumptio memoriae, sed cum resumit aliquis id quod prius scivit vel sensit sensu proprio vel communi, huiusmodi habitum dicimus esse memoriam. Sicut enim memorari refertur ad prius factam notitiam, ita et reminisci. Et tunc est reminisci, scilicet cum aliquo modo resumimus priorem apprehensionem, non autem ita quod reminiscentia sit aliquid eorum quae dicta sunt, vel sensus, vel memoria, vel phantasia, vel scientia; sed per reminiscentiam accidit memorari, quia reminiscentia est quidam motus ad memorandum. Et sic memoria sequitur reminiscentiam, sicut terminus motum.
<td style="text-align:justify">He says first, therefore, that recollection is not the reoccurrence of a memory, for we call it the habit of memory, when something reoccurs which one knew or sensed by the proper senses or the common sense. Now as remembering is referred to a knowledge previously achieved, so also recollecting. Recollecting, however, consists in this, that we recover a prior apprehension in some way, but not in such a way that recollection is one of those things which were mentioned; i.e. senses, memory, fantasy, or science; for remembering occurs through recollection, insofar as recollection is a kind of movement towards remembering. Thus memory follows recollection, as a term (follows) motion.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Vel secundum aliam literam, reminiscentia sequitur memoriam, quia sicut inquisitio rationis est via ad aliquid cognoscendum, et tamen ex aliquo cognito procedit, ita reminiscentia est via ad aliquid memorandum, et tamen ex aliquo memorato procedit, ut infra patebit.
<td style="text-align:justify">357. However according to another (way of) understanding, recollection follows memory, for just as the inquisition of reason is the way towards the knowledge of something, and yet proceeds from something known, so also recollection is the way towards the memory of something, and yet proceeds from something remembered, as will be evident below.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Deinde cum dicit neque itaque hic ostendit quod non quaelibet resumptio sensus vel scientiae est reminiscentia. Et dicit quod non est universaliter hoc verum quod reminiscentia fiat quandocumque iterum fit cognitio scientiae vel sensus, quae prius fuerat; sed quodammodo contingit resumentem scientiam aut sensum reminisci, et quodammodo non. Et quod non sit universaliter verum, ostendit per hoc quod contingit eumdem hominem, secundo post amissam scientiam idem addiscere aut invenire quod prius, hoc tamen non est reminisci. Oportet igitur quod reminisci differat ab his, scilicet ab iterato addiscere vel invenire: et aliquid plus insit, quod sit principium reminiscendi, quam requiratur ad addiscendum. Quid autem sit illud plus, per sequentia manifestatur.
<td style="text-align:justify">358. Then when he says, "And so, not, etc.", he shows that not just any reoccurrence (of the knowledge of) senses or science is recollection. He says that it is not universally true that recollection is achieved whenever the knowledge of science or senses, which was possessed previously, is renewed again, for in one way recollecting is the case in the one recovering (the knowledge of) senses or science, and in another way it is not. That this not universally true he shows by this: it happens that the same man after losing learns or discovers a second time the same thing which he possessed previously, yet this is not recollecting. Therefore, recollecting must differ from these, namely, from learning or discovering a second time. (He also says) that something more is involved in (recollection), which is its starting point, than is required for learning. However, what that something more is, is made evident by the following.
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<h3 align="center">Lectio 5</h3>
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<h3 align="center">LESSON FIVE</h3>
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<td style="text-align:justify">Postquam philosophus inquisivit quomodo reminiscentia se habeat ad alia quae ad cognitionem pertinent, hic incipit manifestare reminiscendi modum.
<td style="text-align:justify">359. After the Philosopher inquired how recollection is related to the other things pertaining to knowledge, he begins to show here the mode of recollecting.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Et primo manifestat modum reminiscendi. Secundo ostendit differentiam inter memoriam et reminiscentiam, ibi, quod quidem igitur non idem sunt.
<td style="text-align:justify">First he shows the mode of recollecting; then he shows the difference between memory and recollection, at the words, "Which, therefore, are not the same, etc."
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<td style="text-align:justify">Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit modum reminiscendi quantum ad res quarum reminiscimur. Secundo quantum ad tempus; reminiscentia enim concernit tempus, sicut memoria, et hoc ibi, maxime autem oportet cognoscere.
<td style="text-align:justify">Concerning the first he does two things. First he shows the mode of recollecting with reference to things which we recollect; then with reference to time, for recollection concerns time as does memory, and this (he shows), at the words, "But it is necessary especially to know, etc."
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<td style="text-align:justify">Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit causam reminiscendi. Secundo ostendit modum, quo proceditur in reminiscendo, ibi, cum igitur reminiscimur.
<td style="text-align:justify">He does two things concerning the first. First he sets forth the cause of recollecting; then he shows the mode by which one proceeds in recollecting, at the words, "Whenever, therefore, we are recollecting, etc."
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<td style="text-align:justify">Causa autem reminiscendi est ordo motuum, qui relinquuntur in anima ex prima impressione eius, quod primo apprehendimus.
<td style="text-align:justify">The cause of recollecting, moreover, is the order of movements which are left in the soul from the first impression of what we apprehend.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Hanc ergo causam primo proponens, dicit quod reminiscentiae contingunt per hoc quod unus motus natus est post alium nobis occurrere: quod quidem contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, quando secundus motus consequitur post primum motum ex necessitate, sicut ad apprehensionem hominis sequitur apprehensio animalis ex necessitate: et sic manifestum est, quod quando anima movetur primo motu, movebitur etiam secundo. Alio vero modo contingit, quia secundus motus sequitur post primum non ex necessitate, sed ex consuetudine, quia scilicet aliquis consuevit post hoc cogitare vel dicere vel facere, et tunc secundus motus sequitur post primum non semper, sed ut ad multum, idest ut in pluribus, sicut etiam effectus naturales ut in pluribus ex suis causis sequuntur, non semper.
<td style="text-align:justify">360. Proposing this cause first, he says, therefore, that recollections occur because one movement naturally presents itself to us after another, and this happens in two ways. In one way, the second movement follows after the first movement from necessity; e.g., the apprehension of animal follows after the apprehension of man from necessity. It is thus evident that when the soul is moved by the first movement, it will be moved by the second also. But it happens in another way insofar as the second movement follows after the first not from necessity, but out of custom. Thus, for instance, someone is accustomed after this (the first movement) to think, or speak, or act, and then the second movement follows after the first, not always, but in the majority of instances; i.e., for the most part, just as natural effects follow from their causes for the most part, but not always.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Dicta autem consuetudo non firmatur aequaliter in omnibus hominibus, sed accidit quod quidam semel cogitando velocius firment in se consuetudinem quam alii, si multotiens cogitent hoc post illud; quod potest contingere vel propter naturam, quae est melius receptiva et retentiva impressionis. Et inde etiam contingit, quod nos semel videntes quaedam, magis memoramur eorum quam alia multotiens visa. Quia ea, quibus vehementius intendimus, magis in memoria manent. Ea vero, quae superficialiter et leviter videmus aut cogitamus, cito a memoria labuntur.
<td style="text-align:justify">361. However the custom spoken of is not established equally in all men. It happens that some by thinking a single time fix the custom more quickly in themselves than others, even if the latter think of the sequence many times. This occurs either on account of greater attention and more profound knowledge, or because their nature is more receptive and retentive of an impression. For this reason also, it happens that certain things seen a single time are remembered better by us than ether things seen many times. The reason is that those things to which we vigorously apply the mind remain better in the memory. On the other hand those things which we see or consider superficially and lightly slip quickly from the memory.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Deinde cum dicit cum igitur ostendit quomodo reminiscentia procedat, supposito praedicto ordine motuum. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo manifestat modum procedendi in reminiscendo. Secundo ostendit unde oporteat reminiscentem procedere, ibi, oportet autem acceptum esse principium.
<td style="text-align:justify">362. Then when he says, "Whenever, therefore, we are recollecting, etc.", he shows how recollection proceeds presupposing the aforesaid order of movements. Concerning this he does two things. First, he shows the mode of proceeding in recollecting; then he shows whence a person must proceed in recollecting, where he says, "But one must get hold of a starting point."
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<td style="text-align:justify">Circa primum duo facit. Primo manifestat modum, quo proceditur in reminiscendo. Secundo ex hoc ostendit qualiter differt reminisci et addiscere, quod supra indeterminatum dimiserat, et hoc ibi, et in hoc reminisci.
<td style="text-align:justify">He does two things concerning the first. First he shows the mode by which one proceeds in recollecting; then from this he shows how recollecting and learning differ, which he left undetermined above; and this (he shows) where he says, "Recollecting differs also in this, etc."
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<td style="text-align:justify">Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit modum reminiscendi. Secundo ex hoc solvit quamdam dubitationem, ibi, nihil autem oportet. Tertio manifestat propositum per signa, ibi, unde citissime.
<td style="text-align:justify">Concerning the first he does three things. First he sets forth the mode of recollecting; then from this he solves a certain doubt, where he says, "However nothing is necessary etc." Finally, he makes clear what he proposed by signs, at the words, Whence most swiftly."
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<td style="text-align:justify">Primo igitur concludit ex praemissis quod, ex quo unus motus sequitur post alterum vel ex necessitate vel ex consuetudine, oportet quod quando reminiscimur, moveamur secundum aliquem horum motuum quousque veniamus ad hoc quod moveamur apprehendendo illo motu, qui consuevit esse post primum, quem scilicet motum intendimus reinvenire reminiscendo, quia reminiscentia nil est aliud quam inquisitio alicuius quod a memoria excidit. Et ideo reminiscendo venamur, id est inquirimus id quod consequenter est ab aliquo priori, quod in memoria tenemus. Sicut enim ille qui inquirit per demonstrationem, procedit ex aliquo priori, quod est notum, ex quo venatur aliquid posterius, quod est ignotum; ita etiam reminiscens, ex aliquo priori, quod in memoria habetur, procedit ad reinveniendum id quod ex memoria excidit.
<td style="text-align:justify">First, therefore, he concludes from the foregoing, that as one movement follows after another, either from necessity or custom, it is necessary, when we recollect, that we be moved by some one of these movements until we come to be moved to apprehend that movement which is wont to follow after the first. This is the movement which we intend to rediscover by recollecting, because recollecting is nothing other than the searching for something which slipped from the memory. Thus by recollecting we hunt; i.e., we seek what follows from something prior which we hold in the memory. For as one who inquires by demonstration proceeds from something prior which is known, from which he hunts something posterior, which is unknown; so also the person recollecting proceeds from something prior which is held in the memory to rediscover what slipped from the memory.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Hoc autem primum, a quo reminiscens suam inquisitionem incipit, quandoque quidem est tempus aliquod notum, quandoque autem aliqua res nota. Secundum tempus quidem incipit quandoque a nunc, idest a praesenti tempore procedendo in praeteritum, cuius quaerit memoriam: puta si quaerit memorari id quod fecit ante quatuor dies, meditatur sic, hodie feci hoc, heri illud, tertia die aliud, et sic secundum consequentiam motuum assuetorum pervenit resolvendo in id quod fecit quarta die. Quandoque vero incipit ab aliquo alio tempore, puta siquis in memoria habeat quid fecerit octavo die ante, et oblitus sit quid fecerit quarta die, procedet descendendo ad septimam, et sic inde quousque veniat ad quartam diem, vel etiam ab octava die ascendet in decimamquintam diem, aut in aliquod aliud tempus praeteritum.
<td style="text-align:justify">363. Moreover, this first thing from which the person recollecting begins his search is sometimes some known time, and sometimes some known thing with respect to time he sometimes begins from the 'now'; i.e., proceeding from the present time into the past, which he seeks to remember. For instance, if he seeks to remember what he did four days ago, he thinks in this manner; today I did this, yesterday that, on the third day another thing; and thus following the succession of accustomed movements he arrives at working out what he did on the fourth day. Sometimes he begins from some other time; e. g., if someone retains in memory what he did eight days ago and has forgotten what he did four days ago, he will proceed by going forward to the seventh day, and so on until he comes to the fourth day, or he will go backward from the eighth day to the fifteenth day, or to some other past time.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Similiter etiam quandoque reminiscitur aliquis incipiens ab aliqua re cuius memoratur, a qua procedit ad aliam, triplici ratione. Quandoque quidem ratione similitudinis, sicut quando aliquid aliquis memoratur de Socrate, et per hoc occurrit ei Plato, qui est similis ei in sapientia. Quandoque vero ratione contrarietatis, sicut si aliquis memoretur Hectoris, et per hoc occurrit ei Achilles. Quandoque vero ratione propinquitatis cuiuscumque, sicut cum aliquis memor est patris, et per hoc occurrit ei filius. Et eadem ratio est de quacumque alia propinquitate, vel societatis, vel loci, vel temporis; et propter hoc fit reminiscentia, quia motus horum seinvicem consequuntur.
<td style="text-align:justify">364. In a like mode someone sometimes recollects beginning from some thing which he remembers, from which he proceeds to another by a threefold relationship. At times (he proceeds) by reason of likeness; e. g., when someone remembers something about Socrates, and through this Plato, who is like him in wisdom, occurs to him. At other times (he proceeds) by reason of contrast; e.g., if someone should remember something about Hector, and through this, Achilles occurs to him. Finally, (he proceeds) at times by reason of any closeness whatever; e.g., when someone is mindful of 'father' and through this 'son' occurs to him. The same procedure holds good for any other close relationship, whether of society, or place, or time. For recollection is formed, inasmuch as movements of these kinds follow each other.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Quorumdam enim praemissorum motus sunt idem, sicut praecipue similium; quorumdam autem simul, scilicet contrariorum, quia cognito uno contrariorum simul cognoscitur aliud; quandoque vero quidam motus habent partem aliorum, sicut contingit in quibuscumque propinquis, quia in unoquoque propinquorum consideratur aliquid quod pertinet ad alterum; et ideo illud residuum, quod deest apprehensioni, cum sit parvum, consequitur motum prioris, ut apprehenso primo, consequenter occurrat apprehensioni secundum.
<td style="text-align:justify">365. For the movements of some of the foregoing are the same, especially of the like things, while the movements of others are simultaneous, namely, of contrary things, because by a knowledge of one contrary the other is simultaneously known. Sometimes some movements have a portion of others, as happens in things closely related. For something is observed in each of the related things which pertains to the other, and thus that overlapping part, which is left out of an apprehension, although it is small, follows on the movement of the first thing; as a result, when the first thing is apprehended, the second occurs to apprehension as a consequent.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Est autem considerandum ulterius, quod quandoque pervenitur ad motum posteriorem ex aliquo priori secundum praedictum modum ab his qui quaerunt invenire motum consequentem perditum, et hoc proprie est reminisci; quando scilicet aliquis ex intentione inquirit alicuius rei memoriam. Contingit autem quandoque quod etiam illi qui non quaerunt memorari, propterea quod sic procedentes ex priori motu in posteriorem, ut dictum est, deveniunt in memoriam alicuius rei,
<td style="text-align:justify">366. However it must be further noted that sometimes those who are seeking to find a consequent lost movement arrive at the posterior movement from some prior movement in the foregoing mode; and this properly is recollecting; namely, when someone intentionally seeks the memory of some things. It sometimes happens indeed that even those who are not seeking to remember arrive at the memory of some thing, for the reason that they are proceeding from a prior movement to a posterior movement, as has been described.
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<td style="text-align:justify">cum ille motus rei oblitae fiat in anima post alium, et hoc quidem erat praeter intentionem sed ut secundum multa, idest in pluribus factis aliis motibus quales diximus, scilicet similibus vel contrariis vel propinquis insurgebat ille motus qui occurrit; sed hoc abusive dicitur reminisci. Est autem casualiter memorari secundum similitudinem quamdam reminiscentiae.
<td style="text-align:justify">Since the movement of the forgotten thing is formed in the soul after the other (movement), and this happens 'in most cases'; i.e., for the most part; then, given the other movements such as we have mentioned; i.e., by similars, contraries and closenesses, that second movement is excited, even when it was not intended. But this is loosely called recollection. It is, however, remembering in a casual way with a certain resemblance to recollection.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Deinde cum dicit nihil autem solvit ex praemissis quamdam dubitationem. Posset enim alicui venire in dubium, quare frequenter memoramur ea quae procul sunt, puta ea quae ante multos annos contigerunt, et non memoramur ea quae sunt prope, puta quae fuerunt ante paucos dies.
<td style="text-align:justify">367. Then, when he says, "However. nothing is necessary, etc.", he solves a certain doubt on the basis of the foregoing. For a doubt could arise (with reference to) why we frequently remember things that are far-off; e.g., things that happened many years before, and we do not remember things that are recent; e.g., things which occurred a few day's before.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Sed ipse dicit, quod circa hoc non oportet intendere, idest dubitando sollicitari, quia manifestum est quod aliqualiter eodem modo hoc accidit, qui in praemissis positus est. Et exponit resumens quod dictum est, scilicet quod contingit quandoque quod anima dicat apprehendendo id quod consequenter est, cuius erat oblita, absque hoc quod praeinquirat, vel ex intentione reminiscatur: quia propter consuetudinem, unus motus sequitur ad alium. Unde insurgente primo motu, sequitur secundus, etiam si homo non intendat. Et sicut contingit hoc ex consuetudine praeter intentionem, ita etiam hoc faciet aliquis cum ex intentione voluerit reminisci: quaeret enim accipere primum motum, ad quem consequatur motus posterior. Et, quia quandoque contingit quod motus eorum quae sunt procul, magis per consuetudinem sunt firmati, propter hoc eorum interdum magis memoramur, vel ex inquisitione vel sine inquisitione.
<td style="text-align:justify">368. But he (Aristotle) says that, it is not necessary to apply the mind to this; i.e., to be disturbed by doubting, because it is clear that this occurs somehow in the same way, (as) was explained in the foregoing. He explains resuming what was said; namely, that it happens sometimes that the soul learns by apprehending a consequent which it had forgotten, without recollecting it by a prior inquiry or intention, for one movement follows another by custom. Hence upon the excitation of the first movement, the second follows, even if the man does not intend it. Now as this happens from custom apart from deliberate intention, so also one will do this when he wishes to recollect intentionally, for he seeks to elicit the first movement upon which the posterior movement follows; because it sometimes happens that the movements of things which are far-off are more established because of custom, therefore, we occasionally remember those things more, whether from inquisition or without inquisition.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Deinde cum dicit unde citissime manifestat praemissum modum per duo signa. Quorum primum ponit dicens, quod, quia ex priori motu propter consuetudinem venitur in sequentem vel inquirendo vel non inquirendo, inde est quod citissime et optime fiunt reminiscentiae, quando incipit aliquis meditari a principio totius negotii, quia secundum ordinem quo res sunt sibiinvicem consecutae, secundum hunc ordinem facti sunt motus eorum in anima: sicut quando quaerimus aliquem versum, prius incipimus a capite.
<td style="text-align:justify">369. Then when he says, "Whence, most swiftly, etc.", he manifests the aforesaid mode (of proceeding) by two signs. The first of these he posits saying that, because a consequent movement comes from a prior movement on account of custom, either by inquiring or not inquiring, therefore, recollections are formed most quickly and best when someone begins to meditate from the beginning of the entire affair, because the movements of things in the soul are formed in conformity with the order in which the things follow each other. So, for instance, when we seek some verse, we begin first at the beginning.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Secundum signum ponit ibi, et sunt. Et dicit quod illa sunt magis reminiscibilia, quaecumque sunt bene ordinata, sicut mathematica et theoremata mathematicorum, quorum secundum concluditur ex primo, et sic deinceps. Illa autem quae sunt male ordinata, difficulter reminiscuntur.
<td style="text-align:justify">370. He gives the second sign, where he says, "Those things are easier to recollect, etc." He says that those things are easier to recollect which are well ordered, such as mathematics and mathematical theorems, for the latter are concluded from the first, and so forth. Those things, however, which are badly ordered are recollected with difficulty."
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<td style="text-align:justify">Sic ergo ad bene memorandum vel reminiscendum, ex praemissis quatuor documenta utilia addiscere possumus. Quorum primum est, ut studeat quae vult retinere in aliquem ordinem deducere. Secundo ut profunde et intente eis mentem apponat. Tertio ut frequenter meditetur secundum ordinem. Quarto ut incipiat reminisci a principio.
<td style="text-align:justify">371. Therefore, to remember or recollect well, we can learn four useful lessons from the foregoing. First one must be careful to reduce to some order what one wishes to retain; then one must apply the mind profoundly and intently to those things; next one must frequently meditate (on them) in order; finally one must begin to recollect from the starting point.
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<h3 align="center">Lectio 6</h3>
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<h3 align="center">LESSON SIX</h3>
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<td style="text-align:justify">Postquam philosophus ostendit modum reminiscendi, hic manifestat duo quae supra dicta sunt. Primo quidem quomodo differant reminisci et iterum addiscere. Secundo quod oportet reminiscentem a principiis incipere, ibi oportet autem acceptum esse.
<td style="text-align:justify">372. After the Philosopher has shown the mode of recollecting, he explains two things here which were mentioned above. The first is how recollecting differs from relearning; the second is that it is necessary that the person recollecting begin from starting points, at the words, "But it is necessary to get hold of a starting point, etc."
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<td style="text-align:justify">Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quomodo differt reminisci et iterum addiscere. Secundo quomodo differt reminisci et iterum invenisse, ibi, multotiens autem.
<td style="text-align:justify">He does two things concerning the first. First he shows how recollection differs from relearning; then how recollection differs from rediscovery, at the words, "However many times, etc."
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<td style="text-align:justify">Circa primum considerandum est, quod tam ille qui reminiscitur quam ille qui iterato addiscit, recuperat notitiam quam amisit: sed ille qui reminiscitur recuperat eam sub ratione memoriae, in ordine scilicet ad id quod prius fuit cognitum; ille autem, qui iterato addiscit, recuperat eam absolute, non quasi alicuius prius cogniti. Cum autem ad notitiam ignotorum non perveniamus nisi ex aliquibus principiis praecognitis, necesse est quod principia, ex quibus procedimus ad aliquid ignotum cognoscendum, sint eiusdem generis, ut patet in primo posteriorum. Et ideo necesse est, quod reminiscens ad recuperandum notitiam sub ratione memoriae procedat ex aliquibus a principio memoratis, quod non contingit iterato addiscere.
<td style="text-align:justify">Concerning the first it must be pointed out, that both he who recollects and he who relearns recovers knowledge which was lost; but he who recollects recovers it under the formality of memory, with reference; namely, to what was previously known. He, however, who relearns recovers it absolutely, and not as if it were of something previously known. Now, since we do not attain to a knowledge of the unknown except from some principles already known, it is necessary that the principles from which we proceed in order to know the unknown be of the same genus, as is evident from the first book of the <i>Posterior Analytics</i>. Therefore it is necessary that a person recollecting should proceed from things remembered as a starting point in order to recover knowledge under the formality of memory, which Ls not the case in relearning.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Dicit ergo, quod in hoc differt reminisci ab hoc quod est iterum addiscere: quia reminiscens habet potestatem quodammodo ut moveatur in aliquid quod consequitur ad primum in memoria retentum, puta cum aliquis recordatur quod tale quid dictum est ei, oblitus est autem quis dixerit ei; utetur ergo ad reminiscendum id cuius est oblitus, eo quod habet in memoria. Sed quando non pervenit ad recuperandum amissam notitiam per principium in memoria retentum, sed per aliquod aliud quod ei de novo traditur a docente, non est memoria nec reminiscentia, sed hoc est de novo addiscere.
<td style="text-align:justify">373. Therefore, he says that recollection differs from relearning in this: a person recollecting has in some way the capacity to be moved to something which is connected to a prior thing retained in memory. For instance, when someone recollecting that something was said to him, but has forgotten who said it, he will use what he has in his memory for the purpose of recollecting what he has forgotten. However, when he does not succeed in recovering the lost knowledge through the starting point retained in memory, but through something else which is proposed to him anew by a teacher, it is neither memory nor recollection, but learning anew.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Deinde cum dicit multoties autem manifestat quomodo differt reminisci et iterum invenire. Et dicit, quod multoties homo non potest iam reminisci eius quod oblitus est, quia non manent in eo motus aliqui, ex quibus possit devenire in id quod quaerit memorari; sed si quaerat, quasi de novo, in notitiam illius rei potest procedere, et multotiens invenit id quod quaerit, ac si de novo scientiam acquireret. Id autem contingit, quando anima diversa excogitans, multis motibus movetur: et si contingat quod perveniat ad motum, quem consequitur cognitio rei, tunc dicitur invenire.
<td style="text-align:justify">374. Then, when he says, "However, many times, etc.", he shows how recollecting differs from rediscovery. He says that frequently a man cannot now recollect what he has forgotten, because the movements by which he can arrive at what he seeks to remember do not remain in him. But if he should seek (knowledge) as if anew, he can proceed to a knowledge of that thing, and many times he finds what he is seeking as if he were acquiring knowledge anew. This happens when the soul is thinking of divers things and is moved by many movements, and if it happens that it hits on the movement with which the knowledge of the thing is connected, it, is said to discover (it).
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<td style="text-align:justify">Ideo autem non potest reminisci, licet posset invenire; quia reminisci contingit per hoc, quod homo interius retinet quamdam potentiam vel virtutem inducendi se ad motus rei quos quaerit: hoc autem contingit, cum potest pervenire ad hoc quod moveatur motu quem amisit per oblivionem: et hoc ex seipso, non ex aliquo docente, ut contingit, quando iterum addiscit, et ex motibus praehabitis, sicut dictum est, non ex novis motibus, sicut quando iterum invenit.
<td style="text-align:justify">375. Therefore, although he can discover, he cannot recollect, because recollection occurs insofar as a man retains interiorly a certain aptitude or capability of leading himself to the movements of the thing which he seeks. But this occurs when he can manage to be moved by the movement which he lost through forgetfulness; this (must happen) by himself) and not from someone teaching, as happens when he relearns; and from movements prepossessed, not from new movements) as when he rediscovers, as has been said.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Deinde cum dicit oportet autem manifestat quod oportet reminiscentem a principio incipere. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit propositum. Secundo assignat causam defectus, quem quandoque patimur in reminiscendo, ibi, eius autem quod ab eodem. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quod oportet reminiscentem incipere a principio. Secundo a quali principio, ibi, videtur autem.
<td style="text-align:justify">Then, when he says, "But it is necessary to get hold of a starting point, etc.", he shows that it is necessary that a person recollecting begin from a starting point. Concerning this he does two things. First he shows what he proposed to do; then he assigns a cause of the defect, which we sometimes suffer in recollecting, at the words, "The cause of one's sometimes recollecting, etc.: He does two things concerning the first (point). First he shows that it is necessary that a person recollecting begin from a starting point; then, from what kind of a starting point, where he says "But it seems".
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<td style="text-align:justify">Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit quod intendit. Et dicit, quod oportet, eum qui vult reminisci, accipere principium, a quo incipit moveri, vel cogitando, vel loquendo, vel aliud faciendo.
<td style="text-align:justify">He does three things concerning the first. First, he sets forth what he intends. He says that it is necessary that a person who wishes to recollect take a starting point from which he begins to be moved either by thinking, or speaking, or doing some other (operation).
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<td style="text-align:justify">Secundo ibi propter quod manifestat quod dixit per signum. Quia enim oportet reminiscentem aliquod principium accipere, unde incipiat procedere ad reminiscendum, inde est quod aliquando homines videntur reminisci a locis, in quibus aliqua sunt dicta vel facta vel cogitata, utentes loco quasi quodam principio ad reminiscendum: quia accessus ad locum est principium quoddam eorum omnium quae in loco aguntur. Unde et Tullius in sua rhetorica docet quod ad facile memorandum oportet imaginari quaedam loca ordinata, quibus phantasmata eorum quae memorari volumus quodam ordine distribuantur.
<td style="text-align:justify">377. Then, where he says, "Because of this, etc.", he shows what he said through a sign. Now, because it is necessary that a person recollecting take some starting point from which he begins the process of recollection, (we find that) men sometimes seem to recollect from places in which things have been said, or done, or thought. They use the place as a certain starting point for recollecting, because access to the place is a certain starting point for all those things which are done in the place. Hence Cicero teaches in his <i>Rhetoric</i>, that, to remember easily, it is necessary to imagine certain ordered places in which the phantasms of those things which we wish to remember are arranged in a certain order.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Tertio ibi, causa autem manifestat propositum per causam, dicens; quod causa quare oportet reminiscentem accipere principium est, quia homines de facili per mentis quamdam evagationem de uno veniunt in aliud ratione similitudinis, aut contrarietatis, aut propinquitatis: sicut si cogitemus vel loquamur de lacte, de facili pervenimus in album propter lactis albedinem, et de albo in aerem propter claritatem diaphani quae causat albedinem, et ab aere in humidum, quia aer est humidus, ab humido autem pervenitur ad reminiscendum temporis autumnalis, quod quaerebat, ratione contrarietatis: quia hoc tempus est frigidum et siccum.
<td style="text-align:justify">378. Then, when he says, "However, the cause is, etc.", he Shows what he has proposed by a cause, saying, that the reason why it is necessary for a person recollecting to take a starting point is that men, by a certain roving of the mind, easily pass from one thing to another by reason of likeness, or contrariety, or closeness. For instance, if we think or speak of milk, we easily pass to white on account of the whiteness of milk; and from white to air on account of the clearness of the transparent medium of light which causes whiteness; and from air to the moist, because air is moist, and from moisture we arrive at a recollection of Autumn, which we come upon by reason of contrariety, because this season is cold and dry.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Deinde cum dicit videtur autem ostendit quale principium reminiscens debeat accipere. Et dicit, quod istud, quod est universale, videtur esse principium et medium, per quod potest perveniri ad omnia. Dicitur hic universale, non illud quod praedicatur de pluribus, sicut in logicis, sed id a quo aliquis consuevit ad diversa moveri; sicut si post lac, aliquis moveatur ad albedinem et ad dulcedinem, et iterum ab albedine ad quaedam alia, sicut dictum est, et iterum a dulcedine ad calorem digerentem, et ad ignem, et alia consequenter cogitata, lac erit quasi universale ad omnes istos motus; et oportet ad hoc recurrere si aliquis voluerit cuiuscumque consequentium reminisci: quia si non reminiscitur alicuius consequentium prius, per alia posteriora principia, saltem reminisci poterit cum venerit ad illud primum universale principium. Aut, si tunc non reminiscitur, non poterit aliunde reminisci.
<td style="text-align:justify">379. Then, when he says, "However, it seems, etc." he shows what kind of a starting point the person recollecting ought to take. He says that what is universal seems to be the starting point and the means by which he can arrive at everything. However, the universal, which is spoken of here is not the one which is spoken of in Logic; namely, that which is predicated of many things; but (it is) that from which one is wont to be moved to divers thing. For instance, if someone, after (the apprehension of) milk, is moved to whiteness and to sweetness; and from whiteness to other things as has been mentioned; and then again from sweetness to digestive heat; and to fire; and consequently to other thoughts, milk is like a universal for all these movements. Now, it is necessary to have recourse to this (starting point) if one wishes to recollect the consequences of anything whatsoever, because if one does not previously recollect the consequences of something through other subsequent starting points, at least he could recollect when he comes on that first universal starting point. Or if he does not recollect then, he cannot recollect from any other source.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Et ponit exemplum de diversis cogitatis per diversas literas, a b g d e z s t. Quas quidem literas enumerat secundum ordinem alphabeti Graeci. Non tamen in reminiscendo est idem ordo, sed accipiendum est quod aliquis cogitando vel loquendo de b, veniat in a, de a vero quandoque quidem in t, quandoque in g, aut quandoque in d, quandoque in e, de g vero quandoque in t, quandoque in a. Si ergo aliquis non reminiscatur eius quod est in g, poterit reminisci eius quod est in e, si veniat ad t ex quo movebatur ad duo, scilicet ad e et ad d. Sed forte non quaerebat e, neque d, sed quaerebat s vel z; tunc veniens ad g reminiscetur. Sed, quia nescimus utrum id quod quaerimus contineatur sub e, vel sub g, oportet recurrere ad a, quod est quasi universale respectu omnium. Et sic semper oportet procedere: puta si adhuc b sit universalius quam a.
<td style="text-align:justify">380. He gives the example of divers thoughts (expressed) by divers letters: A, B, G, D, E, Z, S, and T. He lists these letters according to the order of the Greek alphabet. Yet in recollecting the same order is not (followed); but it must be granted that someone thinking or speaking of B might pass to A; (thinking or speaking) of A, sometimes to E, sometimes to G D, or sometimes to D, or sometimes to E; (thinking or speaking) of G, sometimes to I, sometimes to A. Therefore, if someone does not recollect what is under G, he can recollect what is under E, if he comes to E, and from it is moved to two letters; namely, to E and D. But perhaps he did not seek E nor D, but sought S or Z; then, he will recollect upon coming to G. But because we do not know whether what we are seeking is contained under E or under G; it is necessary to have recourse to A which is as a universal with respect to all the letters. It is always necessary to proceed in such a way; e.g., if B were yet more universal than A.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Potest autem et aliter dispositio praedicta intelligi, ut ab a directe quidem veniatur in g, lateraliter autem in b: g autem lateraliter quidem in I, hinc inde, directe autem in t a quo in d et e. Et inde dicit quod si aliquis non meminit in e quod est ultimum venit in t quod est prius; et si forte in d non meminit, quia id quod quaerit non continetur sub eo, recurrendum est ad g, sub quo quaedam alia continentur, puta a z, et deinde in a, ut prius dictum est sub quo continetur etiam b: quod quidem in proposita linea conspici potest.
<td style="text-align:justify">381. However the aforesaid arrangement can be understood In another way, so that he would come from A directly to G, but laterally (from) B to A, from G laterally to I, and from here, then, directly to T, from which (he could come) to D and E. Therefore, he (Aristotle) says that If someone remembers at E which is last, he comes upon T which is preceding. If perhaps he does not remember at T, because what he seeks is not contained under it, he would have recourse to G, under which certain other (letters) are contained; e.g., A and Z; and after that to A, as has been said, under which B is also contained. This can be observed in the line proposed.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Deinde cum dicit eius autem assignat causam defectus quam reminiscentes patiuntur. Et primo quantum ad hoc, quod omnino reminiscimur. Secundo quantum ad hoc quod corrupte reminiscimur, ibi quoniam autem. Dicit ergo primo, quod ideo ab eodem principio accepto quandoque homines reminiscuntur, et quandoque non, quia contingit quod ab eodem principio a quo movetur aliquis ad diversa, pluries movetur ad unum quam ad aliud: puta si ab ipso g moveatur in e et in d pluries in unum quam in aliud. Unde eo accepto, de facili reminiscitur eius, in quod pluries consuevit moveri. Si vero non moveatur per antiquum, idest per id, per quod magis consuevit moveri, movetur minus consuete, et ideo non de facili reminiscitur, quia consuetudo est quasi quaedam natura. Unde sicut ea quae sunt naturaliter de facili fiunt et reparantur, inquantum scilicet res cito redeunt ad suam naturam propter naturae inclinationem, ut patet in aqua calefacta quae cito redit ad frigiditatem, ita etiam ea quae multoties consideravimus, de facili reminiscimur propter inclinationem consuetudinis.
<td style="text-align:justify">382. Therefore, when he says, "The cause of a person's sometimes recollecting, etc." he assigns the cause of the defect which persons recollecting suffer. First (he considers) the case of not recollecting at all; and secondly, the case of a defective recollection, where he says, "And since, etc." Therefore, he says first, that because it happens that from the same starting point from which someone is moved to divers thing, he is moved more frequently to one than. to another; therefore, even given the same starting point, men sometimes recollect and sometimes do not. For instance, if someone were moved from G to E and D, (he will be moved) more times to one than to the other. Whence given this (starting point), he recollects easily that towards which he is more frequently accustomed to be moved. But if he is not moved by the 'old way'; i.e., by that through which he more accustomed to be moved, he is moved in a less accustomed way; and, therefore, he does not easily recollect because custom is, as it were, a kind of nature. For just an things which exist by nature are formed and repaired easily, for things quickly return to their own nature by the inclination of nature (as is evident from hot water which quickly returns to cold); so also we easily recollect things which we considered many times by the inclination of custom.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Quod autem consuetudo sit sicut natura, manifestat per hoc, quod sicut in natura quidam fit ordo, quo hoc potest hoc fit, ita etiam quando multae operationes per ordinem se consequuntur, faciunt quamdam naturam: et hoc praecipue contingit in operationibus animalium, in quorum principiis aliquid est imprimens, et aliquid impressionem recipiens, sicut imaginatio recipit impressionem sensus. Et ideo quae frequenter vidimus vel audivimus magis in imaginatione firmantur per modum cuiusdam naturae; sicut etiam multiplicatio impressionis agentis naturalis producit ad formam, quae est natura rei.
<td style="text-align:justify">383. He shows that custom is like a nature by this: as in nature there is a certain order by which something comes to be after something else; so also when many activities succeed one another in an order, they produce a kind of nature. This occurs especially in the activities of animals, in whose principles (of action) one thing is impressing, and another is receiving the impression of the senses. Therefore, those things which we saw or heard frequently are more firmly fixed in the imagination after the mode of a kind of nature. So, for instance, the multiplication of the impression of a natural agent works toward the form which is the nature of the thing.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Deinde cum dicit quoniam autem ostendit causam quare quandoque corrupte reminiscamur. Et dicit quod sicut in his quae sunt secundum naturam contingit aliquid quod est extra naturam, quod est a fortuna vel casu, sicut monstratur in partibus animalium, multo magis contingit aliquid inordinatum et praeter intentionem in his quae sunt secundum consuetudinem, quae etsi imitetur naturam, deficit tamen a firmitate ipsius. Et ideo etiam ibi, idest in his quae per consuetudinem reminiscimur, contingit reminisci aliter et aliter; et hoc accidit propter aliquod impedimentum, puta cum aliquis retrahitur inde, idest a consueto cursu ad quodcumque aliud, ut patet in his, qui memoriter aliquid dicunt, quorum imaginatio si ad aliud distrahatur, perdunt quod dicere debent vel dicunt corrupte: et propter hoc, cum aliquis indigeat reminisci aliquod nomen, vel aliquem sermonem, facimus circa alium sermonem dissimiliter ab eo quod scimus.
<td style="text-align:justify">384. Then when he says, "Since in those things which are in the realm of nature, etc.", he shows the reason why we sometimes recollect defectively. He says that, as in those things which are according to nature, something may occur which is outside of nature, which happens by chance or fortune, as is seen in the parts of animals; so much more does something irregular and outside intention occur in those things which are according to custom, which although it imitates nature, is yet lacking its firmness. Therefore, even in this matter; i.e., in these things which we recollect through custom, recollecting works out differently on different occasions, and this happens on account of some impediment; e.g., when someone is distracted 'thence'; i.e., from the accustomed course to some other. This is evident in the case of those who say something from memory, for if their imagination is distracted to something else, they lose what they ought to say or say it defectively. On this account, when one needs to recollect some name or some word, he produces the word in a manner different from what he knows (conserves).
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<td style="text-align:justify">Ultimo autem epilogat, quod reminisci accidit secundum modum praemissum.
<td style="text-align:justify">385. Finally, he summarizes the section (saying) that recollection occurs according to the aforesaid mode.
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<h3 align="center">Lectio 7</h3>
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<h3 align="center">LESSON SEVEN</h3>
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<td style="text-align:justify">Postquam philosophus manifestavit modum reminiscendi ex parte rerum reminiscendarum, hic determinat modum reminiscendi ex parte temporis.
<td style="text-align:justify">386. Now that the Philosopher has shown the mode of recollecting from the point of view of the things recollected, he determines here the mode of recollecting from the point of view of time.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Et primo proponit quod intendit. Secundo manifestat propositum, ibi, est autem aliquid. Dicit ergo primo, quod in reminiscendo oportet maxime cognoscere tempus, scilicet praeteritum, quod concernit memoria, cuius inquisitio quaedam est reminiscentia. Tempus autem praeteritum cognoscitur a reminiscente quandoque quidem sub certa mensura, puta cum scit se hoc sensisse quandoque ante tres dies, quandoque autem infinite, idest indeterminate, puta si recordetur se aliquando hoc sensisse.
<td style="text-align:justify">First he sets forth what he intends; then he shows what he proposed to do, at the words, "There is something, etc." He says, therefore, first, that in recollecting it is especially necessary to know time; namely, past time, which is the concern of memory, of which recollection is the search. However, past time is sometimes known by the person recollecting under a certain measure; e. g., when he knows that he sensed this thing at some time three days ago; and sometimes indefinitely; i.e., indeterminately; e.g., if he recalls that he sensed this at some time or other.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Deinde cum dicit est autem manifestat propositum. Et primo ostendit quomodo anima cognoscat mensuram temporis. Secundo manifestat principale propositum, scilicet quod cognoscere tempus necessarium est reminiscenti, ibi, cum igitur rei. Et circa primum duo facit. Primo manifestat propositum. Secundo movet quamdam quaestionem, ibi, quomodo enim differt.
<td style="text-align:justify">387. Then when he says, "There is something, etc.", he shows what he proposed to do. First he shows how the soul knows the measure of time; then he shows the principal proposal; namely, that knowing time is necessary to the person recollecting, where he says, "When, therefore, (the movement) of a thing, etc." Concerning the first, he does two things. First, he shows what he proposes to do; then he presents a certain question, at the words, "For how it differs, etc."
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<td style="text-align:justify">Dicit ergo primo, quod aliquid est in anima, quo iudicat maiorem et minorem mensuram temporis. Et hoc rationabile est esse circa tempus, sicut et circa magnitudines corporales: magnas quidem, quantum ad quantitatem corporum visorum, et procul, quantum ad quantitatem distantiae localis, cui proportionatur quantitas temporis, quae accipitur secundum distantiam a praesenti nunc.
<td style="text-align:justify">He says, therefore, first, that there is something in the soul by which it judges the greater and lesser measure of time. (The fact) that there is (something in the soul) that judges about time is reasonable, for it judges about physical magnitudes, which the soul understands; the 'large'; for instance, in relation to the quantity of visualized bodies, and the 'far-off' with respect to the extension of local distance. The amount of time, which is measured according to distance from the present instant (nunc), is proportioned to this.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Huiusmodi autem magnitudines cognoscit anima non extendendo ibi intelligentiam, quasi anima cognoscat magnitudinem, contingendo eas secundum intellectum: quod videtur dicere propter Platonem, ut patet in primo de anima. Et per hunc etiam modum quidam dicunt visum fieri per hoc quod radius pertransit totam distantiam usque ad rem visam, ut dictum est in libro de sensu et sensato. Sed non potest esse quod magnitudines cognoscantur ab anima per contactum intelligentiae, quia sic non posset anima intelligere nisi magnitudines existentes: nunc autem videmus quod intelligit magnitudines quae non sunt. Nihil enim prohibet animam intelligere quantitatem duplam quantitatis caeli. Non ergo cognoscit anima magnitudinem ei se coextendendo, sed per hoc, quod quidam motus a re sensibili resolutus in anima, est proportionalis magnitudini exteriori. Sunt enim in anima quaedam formae et motus similes rebus, per quas res cognoscit.
<td style="text-align:justify">388. However the soul knows magnitudes of this kind not by extending the understanding thereon, as if the soul knew magnitudes by touching them with the intellect. He seems to say this on account of Plato, as is evident in the first book <i>On the Soul</i>. By this mode also, some people say that seeing is effected, because a ray passes the whole distance to the thing seen, as was mentioned in the second book <i>On Sense and Sensation</i>. But it is impossible that magnitudes are known by the soul by contact with the understanding, because in such a case the soul could not understand any but existing magnitudes; whereas in fact it understands magnitudes which are not existing. For nothing prevents the soul from understanding double the quantity of the heavens. Therefore, the soul does not know magnitude by stretching itself out upon the thing, but rather, because a certain movement from the sensible thing reflected in the soul, is proportional to the exterior magnitude. For there are in the sol certain forms and movements similar to things by which it knows the things.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Deinde cum dicit quo enim determinat quamdam quaestionem circa praemissa. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo proponit quaestionem. Secundo solvit, ibi, aut quia. Tertio solutionem exemplificat in literis, ibi, sicut igitur.
<td style="text-align:justify">389. Then, when he says, "For how it differs, etc.", he settles a certain question concerning the aforesaid. Concerning this he does three things. First he sets forth the question; then he solves it, at the words, "Or because, etc." Finally he exemplifies the solution in letters, where he says, "As, therefore, etc."
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<td style="text-align:justify">Quaerit ergo primo, cum anima per similitudinem magnitudinis quam habet magnitudinem cognoscat, in quo differt illud quo cognoscit maiorem et minorem magnitudinem? Videtur enim non habere differentem similitudinem, eo quod non differunt specie.
<td style="text-align:justify">Since the soul knows magnitude by the image which it possesses of magnitude, he seeks first, therefore, how does that way differ from the way by which it knows the greater and lesser magnitude. For it does not, seem to have a different image because it does not differ in species.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Deinde cum dicit an quia solvit quaestionem. Et dicit quod anima vel per similem figuram sive formam intelligit minora, idest minorem quantitatem, sicut et per formam similem cognoscit maiorem magnitudinem. Formae enim et motus interiores proportionaliter correspondent magnitudinibus exterioribus, et forte ita est de magnitudinibus sive distantiis locorum et temporum, sicut de speciebus rerum. Unde, sicut in ipso cognoscente sunt diversae similitudines et motus proportionaliter respondentes diversis speciebus rerum, puta equo et bovi, ita etiam et diversis quantitatibus.
<td style="text-align:justify">390. Then, when he says, "Or because, etc." he solves the question. He says that the soul by a similar figure or form understands lesser; i.e., a lesser quantity, just as by a similar form it knows a greater magnitude. For interior forms and movements correspond proportionately to exterior magnitudes, and perhaps the situation in respect to magnitudes or distances or places and times is the same as that of species of things; Hence, as there are divers images and movements in the knower responding proportionately to divers species of things; e.g., to a horse or a cow, also (there are divers images corresponding to divers quantities.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Deinde cum dicit sic igitur manifestat huiusmodi diversam proportionem per exemplum in literis. Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum est quod quia supra dixit in intelligentia esse similes figuras et motus proportionales rebus, utitur hic gratia exempli similitudine figurarum, sicut geometrae utuntur: apud quod figurae similes dicuntur, quarum latera sunt proportionabilia et anguli aequales, ut patet in sexto Euclidis: (figura).
<td style="text-align:justify">391. Then, when he says, "As, therefore, etc.", he shows this diverse proportion by an example in letters. To clarify this, it must be noted, that, because he said above that in the understanding there are similar figures and movements proportioned to things, (the example he uses here) is that of the similarity of figures, as geometricians use (them). They call figures similar (when) their sides are proportional and their angles are equal, as evident in the sixth book of Euclid:
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<td style="text-align:justify">Describatur ergo triangulus bae, cuius basis sit be. Deinde a puncto g signato in latere ba ducatur linea aeque distans a basi usque ad aliud latus, quae sit gd; et similiter in triangulo gad, producatur linea aeque distans a basi. Est autem demonstratum in primo Euclidis, quod linea recta cadens super duas aeque distantes, facit angulos oppositos aequales. Angulus ergo agd est aequalis angulo aeb, et angulus adg est aequalis angulo aeb: angulus autem a est communis: ergo tres anguli trianguli agd, sunt aequales angulis trianguli bae: ergo lineae, quae subtenduntur aequalibus angulis, sunt proportionales, secundum quartam proportionem sexti Euclidis; ergo proportio quae est ab ab ad ag, eadem est proportio be ad gd; ergo permutatim, quae est proportio ab ad be eadem est proportio ag ad gd: et sic duo trianguli praedicti sunt figurae similes. Per lineam vero ab et partes eius, intelliguntur motus animae, quibus anima cognoscit. Per lineas autem be, gd et zi, quae sunt bases triangulorum, intelliguntur diversae quantitates, magnitudine et parvitate differentes.
<td style="text-align:justify">392. Therefore, the triangle BAE is drawn, whose base is BE. Then, from a point marked G inside BA, a line, GD, is drawn Equidistant from the base to the other side; and. likewise a line equidistant from the base drawn in triangle GAD. Now it has been demonstrated in the first book of Euclid, that a straight line falling upon two equidistant (lines) has opposite angles equal. Angle AGB, therefore, is equal be AEB, and angle ADG is equal to angle AEB, but angle A is common. The three angles of triangle AGD, therefore are equal to the angles of triangle BAE; therefore, the lines which are subtended by the equal angles are proportional according to the fourth proportion in the sixth book of Euclid. Therefore, the proportion of AB to AG is the same as the proportion (of) BE to CD; therefore, alternately, the proportion (of) AB to BE is the same as the proportion (of) AG to GD; and thus the two aforesaid triangles are similar figures. Now, by the line AB and its parts, are understood the movements of the soul by which the soul knows, Then, by the lines BE, GD, and ZI, which are the bases of the triangle, are understood divers quantities, differing in greatness and smallness.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Concludit ergo exemplificando quod, si anima secundum motum ab, movetur ad cognoscendum quantitatem be, faciet etiam iste motus secundum aliquid sui cognosci quantitatem gd; quia motus ag qui continetur in ab, et magnitudo gd in eadem proportione se habent, in qua motus ab et magnitudo be.
<td style="text-align:justify">393. Therefore, he concludes by this example: if the soul is moved according to movement AB to know quantity BE, this movement will by itself make quantity GD to be known, because movement AG, which is contained in AB, and the magnitude GD, are related by the same proportion as the movement AB and the magnitude BE.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Sed tunc redibit quaestio, quae supra mota est: cum plus requiratur ad cognoscendum quantitatem gd, quae est maior, quam ad cognoscendum quantitatem zi quae est minor.
<td style="text-align:justify">394. But then the question which was raised above, will recur, since more is required to know quantity GD, which is greater than for knowing quantity ZI, which is lesser.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Et ut hoc expressius videri possit, accipit motus ut distinctos quorum unus non contineatur in altero. Sit ergo una linea km, et dividatur in puncto t tali ratione, ut eadem sit proportio kt ad tm, quae est lineae ag, secundum quam cognoscitur quantitas gd, ad lineam ab, secundum quam cognoscitur be. Sic ergo simul (figura). Movetur secundum hos motus: quia sicut secundum motum ag cognoscitur quantitas gd, ita secundum motum kt. Et sicut secundum motum ab cognoscitur quantitas be, ita secundum motum tm. Si vero aliquis velit secundum motum az, cognoscere quantitatem zi, oportebit quod subtrahatur ab ag hoc quod est gz; sicut ei addebatur gb ad cognoscendum quantitatem be. Sed, si volumus accipere motus distinctos, oportebit accipere loco duorum motuum kt et tm, loco cuius ponit te, ita quod est g et m. Inscribantur eidem puncto alii duo motus: quorum unus sit kl et alius lm, ita quod linea km dividatur in puncto l, et ob hanc rationem, ut sit proportio kl ad lm sicut proportio az ad ab. Unde sicut per motum lm cognoscet quantitatem be, ita per motum kl cognoscet zi. Quod quidem sic demonstratur.
<td style="text-align:justify">395. That this might, be more explicitly seen, he takes distinct movements, one of which is not contained in the other. Therefore, let one line, KM, be divided at point T in such away, that there is the same proportion of KT to IM as of line AG (by which quantity GD is known) to line AB (by which BE is known). Thus, at the same time, (the soul) is moved according to these movements, because as quantity GD is known by movement AB, so also by movement KT. Now as quantity BE is known by movement AB, so also it is known by movement TM. If someone wishes to know quantity ZI by movement AZ, it is necessary the GZ be subtracted from AG, as GB is added to it to know quantity BE. But if we wish to take distinct movements, it will be necessary to take TE, in place of the two movements Kt AND tm, SO THAT IT IS g AND m. The other two movements are drawn at the same point (as before); one is KL and the other LM, so that line KM is divided at point L, and in such a way that the proportion of KL to LM (is) the same as the proportion of AZ to AB. Whence, as he knows quantity BE by movement LM, so, by movement KL he knows ZI. It is thus demonstrated.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Deinde cum dicit cum igitur manifestat principale propositum. Et primo ostendit quod reminiscentem oportet cognoscere tempus. Secundo manifestat duplicem modum cognoscendi tempus, ibi, qui vero est temporis.
<td style="text-align:justify">396. Then, when he says, "Since, therefore, etc.", he shows the principal proposal. First he shows that it is necessary that the person recollecting know time; then he shows a twofold mode of knowing time, at the words, "Which, indeed, is of time, etc."
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<td style="text-align:justify">Dicit ergo primo, quod quando in anima simul occurrit motus rei memorandae et temporis praeteriti, tunc est memoriae actus. Si vero aliquis putet ita se habere, et non ita fiat in memoria, quia vel deest motus rei, vel motus temporis, non est memoratum. Nihil enim prohibet quod in memore insit mendacium, sicut cum alicui videtur quod memoretur et non memoratur, quia occurrit ei tempus praeteritum, sed non res quam vidit, sed alia loco eius. Et quandoque aliquis memoratur et non putat se memorari: sed latet ipsum, quia scilicet non occurrit ei tempus, sed res, quia ut supra dictum est, hoc est memorari, phantasmati intendere alicuius rei prout est imago prius apprehensi. Unde, si motus rei fiat sine motu temporis, aut e converso, non reminiscitur.
<td style="text-align:justify">Therefore, he says first that when a movement of an object to be remembered and of past time occurs in the soul at the same time, there is then an act of memory. But if someone should think himself so disposed, and is not put in the state of memory in this way, because either the movement of the thing or the movement of time is lacking, he has not remembered. For nothing prevents there being a misrepresentation in the memory; e.g., when it seems to someone that he remembers, and (yet) he does not remember, because the past time occurs to him, but no the thing which he saw, but another in its place. Sometimes one remembers and does not think that he remembers. It is hidden from him simply because the time does not occur to him, but (only) the thing, for as has been said above, remembering is to intend the phantasm of some thing as it is an image of some thing previously apprehended. Hence, if the movement of the thing is made without the movement of time, or conversely, he does not recollect.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Deinde cum dicit qui vero ostendit diversum modum quo reminiscentes cognoscunt tempus. Quandoque enim aliquis recordatur tempus non quidem sub certa mensura, puta quod tertia die fecerit aliquid, sed quod aliquando fecit. Quandoque autem recordatur sub mensura temporis praeteriti, quamvis non sub certa mensura. Consueverunt enim homines dicere quod recordantur quidem alicuius rei ut praeteritae, sed nesciunt quando fuerit, quia nesciunt temporis metrum, idest, mensuram: et hoc contingit propter debilem impressionem, sicut contingit in his quae videntur a remotis, quae indeterminata cognoscuntur.
<td style="text-align:justify">397. Then, when he says, "Which, indeed, is etc.", he shows the divers modes by which persons recollecting know time. For sometimes someone remembers time, but not under a definite measure; e.g., (not) that he did something the day before yesterday, but that he did it at some time. On the other hand, sometimes someone remembers under a measure of past time, although not under a definite measure. For men are accustomed to say that they remember something as past; but they do not know when it was, because they do not know the length of time; i.e., the measure. This happens because of a weak movement as is the case with those things which are seen from far-off, and are known indeterminately.
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<td style="text-align:justify">
<h3 align="center">Lectio 8</h3>
<td style="text-align:justify">
<h3 align="center">LESSON EIGHT</h3>
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<td style="text-align:justify">Postquam philosophus ostendit modum reminiscendi, nunc ostendit differentiam memoriae et reminiscentiae. Innuit autem tres differentias: quarum prima est ex aptitudine ad utrumque. Dictum est enim supra quod non iidem homines sunt bene memorativi et reminiscitivi. Secunda autem differentia est ex parte temporis, quia scilicet reminiscentia, cum sit via ad memoriam, tempore ipsam praecedit, ut ex praedictis patet. Tertia differentia est ex parte subiecti in quo utrumque eorum inveniri potest: quia hoc quod est memorari, multa alia animalia participant praeter hominem, ut etiam supra dictum est; sed nullum animal quod a nobis cognoscatur, reminiscitur, nisi homo, quod quidem dicit, quia apud quosdam dubium fuit, an aliquod animal esset rationale praeter hominem.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Causa autem quare soli homini convenit reminisci, est quia reminiscentia habet similitudinem cuiusdam syllogismi; quare, sicut in syllogismo pervenitur ad conclusionem ex aliquibus principiis, ita etiam in reminiscendo aliquis quodam modo syllogizat se prius aliquid vidisse, aut aliquo alio modo percepisse, ex quodam principio in hoc deveniens: et reminiscentia est quasi quaedam inquisitio, quia non a casu reminiscens ab uno in aliud, sed cum intentione deveniendi in memoriam alicuius procedit. Hoc autem, scilicet quod aliquis inquirat in aliud pervenire, solum illis accidit, quibus inest naturalis virtus ad deliberandum: quia etiam deliberatio fit per modum cuiusdam syllogismi; deliberatio autem solis hominibus competit: cetera vero animalia non ex deliberatione, sed ex quodam naturali instinctu operantur.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Deinde cum dicit quod autem ostendit qualis passio sit reminiscentia. Quia enim dixerat quod reminiscentia est sicut syllogismus quidam: syllogizare autem est actus rationis, quae non est actus corporis cuiusdam, ut probatur secundum de anima, posset alicui videri quod reminiscentia non esset passio corporea, idest operatio exercitata per organum corporale. Philosophus autem ostendit contrarium.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Et primo quidem per quoddam quod accidit reminiscentibus. Secundo per eos qui habent impedimentum reminiscentiae, ibi, sunt autem et superiora. Circa primum tria facit. Primo inducit accidens praedictum. Secundo assignat causam praedicti accidentis, ibi, causa autem eius. Tertio manifestat per simile, ibi, unde et irae et timores. Dicit ergo primo, quod signum huius quod reminiscentia sit quaedam corporea passio, sive existens inquisitio phantasmatis in tali, idest in aliquo particulari, vel in tali, idest in quodam organo corporeo, est, quod cum quidam non possunt reminisci turbantur, id est quadam inquietudine sollicitantur, et valde apponunt mentem ad reminiscendum. Et si contingat quod iam de cetero non conentur ad reminiscendum, quasi cessante a proposito reminiscendi, nihilominus adhuc inquietudo illa cogitationis remanet in eis; et hoc maxime contingit in melancholicis, qui maxime moventur a phantasmatibus: quia propter terrestrem naturam, impressiones phantasmatum magis firmantur in eis.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Deinde cum dicit causa autem assignat causam praedicti accidentis. Et primo ponit causam. Secundo ostendit in quibus maxime locum habet, ibi, maxime autem turbantur. Circa primum considerandum est, quod operationes, quae sunt partis intellectivae absque organo corporali, sunt in sui arbitrio ut possit ab eis desistere cum voluerit. Sed non ita est de operationibus quae per organum corporale exercentur: quia non est in potestate hominis quod ex quo organum corporale est mere eius passio statim cesset. Et ideo dicit quod causa eius, quod est reminisci, non ita est in ipsis reminiscentibus, idest in potestate eorum, ut scilicet possint desistere cum voluerint: quia sicut accidit proiicientibus quod postquam moverit corpus proiectum, non est amplius in eorum potestate ut sistant, sic etiam reminiscens et quicumque investigans per organum corporale, movet corporale organum in quo est passio. Unde non statim motus cessat cum homo voluerit.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Deinde cum dicit maxime autem ostendit in quibus maxime praedicta causa locum habeat. Et dicit quod maxime turbantur, idest commoventur in reminiscendo illi, quibus humiditas abundat circa locum ubi sunt organa sensuum, puta circa cerebrum et circa cor: quia humiditas mota non de facili quiescit, quousque occurrat illud quod quaeritur, et motus inquisitionis procedat recte usque ad terminum. Nec est contrarium quod supra dixit, hoc maxime accidere melancholicis, qui sunt siccae naturae: quia in illis contingit propter violentam impressionem, in his autem propter facilem commotionem.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Deinde cum dicit unde et manifestat quod dixerat per simile. Et ponit duo similia. Quorum primum est de passionibus animae, quibus organum corporale quodam modo commovetur. Et dicit quod quando ira, vel timor, vel concupiscentia, vel si quid huiusmodi movetur contra aliquod obiectum, etiam si homines velint in contrarium movere, retrahendo se ab ira vel timore, non sedatur passio, sed contra idem adhuc movetur: quod contingit, quia commotio corporalis organi non statim quietatur.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Secundum simile ponit ibi, et comparatur. Et dicit quod praedicta passio, quae accidit in reminiscendo, comparatur nominibus et melodiis et ratiocinationibus cum aliquod eorum cum aliqua intentione per os proferatur, sicut accidit his qui cum magna intentione recitant, nominant, vel cantant, vel argumentantur: quia quando ipsi volunt desistere, adhuc praeter intentionem eorum accidit quod cantent, vel aliquid proferant, propter hoc quod motus pristinae imaginationis adhuc manet in organo corporali.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Deinde cum dicit sunt autem manifestat propositum per hoc quod reminiscentia impeditur per aliquam corporalem dispositionem. Et ponit duas dispositiones corporales impedientes reminiscentiam. Quarum primam ponit dicens, quod illi qui habent membra superiora maiora quam inferiora, quae est dispositio nanorum, quia habent curtas tibias, et superiorem partem corporis proportionaliter maiorem, sunt peius memorativi, quam illi qui habent contrariam dispositionem, propter hoc, quod organum sensitivum in eis, quod est in superiori parte, est aggravatum in eis multitudine materiae, et propter hoc nec motus sensibilium in eis diu possunt permanere, sed cito dissolvuntur propter confusionem humorum, quod pertinet ad defectum memoriae; nec etiam de facili possunt recte procedere reminiscendo: quia non possunt regulare motum materiae, quod pertinet ad defectum reminiscentiae.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Secunda dispositio impediens est, quod illi qui sunt penitus novi, sicut pueri nuper nati et multum senes sunt immemores, propter motum augmenti qui est in pueris, et decrementi qui est in senibus, ut supra dictum est, haec dispositio partim convenit cum prima, scilicet quantum ad pueros, qui usque ad longam aetatem sunt nanosi, quasi habentes superiorem partem corporis maiorem.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Secunda dispositio impediens est, quod illi qui sunt penitus novi, sicut pueri nuper nati et multum senes sunt immemores, propter motum augmenti qui est in pueris, et decrementi qui est in senibus, ut supra dictum est, haec dispositio partim convenit cum prima, scilicet quantum ad pueros, qui usque ad longam aetatem sunt nanosi, quasi habentes superiorem partem corporis maiorem.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Sic ergo patet quod reminiscentia est corporalis passio, nec est actus partis intellectivae, sed sensitivae, quae etiam in homine est nobilior et virtuosior quam in aliis animalibus propter coniunctionem ad intellectum. Semper enim quod est inferioris ordinis perfectius fit suo superiori coniunctum, quasi aliquid de eius perfectione participans.
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<td style="text-align:justify">Ultimo autem epilogando concludit quod dictum est de memoria et memorari quae sit natura ipsorum, et per quam partem animae animalia memorantur, et similiter de reminiscentia quid sit, et quomodo fiat, et propter quam causam.
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<hr>
</blockquote>
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